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Abstract The epistemic modal auxiliaries must and might are vehicles for ex-
pressing the force with which a proposition follows from some body of evidence
or information. Standard approaches model these operators using quantificational
modal logic, but probabilistic approaches are becoming increasingly influential.
According to a traditional view, must is a maximally strong epistemic operator
and might is a bare possibility one. A competing account—popular amongst pro-
ponents of a probabilisitic turn—says that, given a body of evidence, must φ entails
that Pr(φ) is high but non-maximal and might φ that Pr(φ) is significantly greater
than 0. Drawing on several observations concerning the behavior of must, might
and similar epistemic operators in evidential contexts, deductive inferences, down-
playing and retractions scenarios, and expressions of epistemic tension, I argue
that those two influential accounts have systematic descriptive shortcomings. To
better make sense of their complex behavior, I propose instead a broadly Kratze-
rian account according to which must φ entails that Pr(φ) = 1 and might φ that
Pr(φ) > 0, given a body of evidence and a set of normality assumptions about
the world. From this perspective, must and might are vehicles for expressing a
common mode of reasoning whereby we draw inferences from specific bits of evi-
dence against a rich set of background assumptions—some of which we represent
as defeasible—which capture our general expectations about the world. I will show
that the predictions of this Kratzerian account can be substantially refined once it
is combined with a specific yet independently motivated ‘grammatical’ approach
to the computation of scalar implicatures. Finally, I discuss some implications of
these results for more general discussions concerning the empirical and theoretical
motivation to adopt a probabilisitic semantic framework.
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1 Introduction
Epistemic modals such as must and might are vehicles for expressing what follows,
and with what force, from some specific body of evidence or information. Standard
accounts model epistemics using tools from quantificational modal logic, but there
is increasing interest in the hypothesis that natural languages interface with, or
have access to, a kind of (natural) probabilistic logic. This probabilistic turn has
led to attractive accounts of adjectives such as probably and likely, and various
other modal operators, but its extension to the epistemic auxiliaries remains con-
troversial.1 In addition, while much work has tried to motivate the general move
to a probabilistic framework, comparatively less has examined specific accounts
of the strength of epistemic must and might. Yet given the expressive power of
probabilistic frameworks, they can be used to model a wide range of specific se-
mantic accounts. So unless we can substantially constrain the possibilities, the
move to a probabilistic framework, as such, will provide no special insight into the
fascinating interface between our linguistic and our general cognitive capacities
to reason from (usually limited) information. This paper motivates several em-
pirical constraints on semantic and probabilistic models of must and might, and
uses them to discriminate amongst three reasonable hypotheses concerning their
strength and shed light on central properties of the specific mode of reasoning
from information which those epistemic operators seem to target.
Focusing on their epistemic readings, the modal auxiliaries must and might
are part of a complex maze of acceptability patterns. In this paper, I focus on
variations of some widely-discussed patterns which, taken together, present a dif-
ficult descriptive challenge to any account of these operators. To get a sense for
the challenge, consider the uses of must in (1)-(4). ‘Deductive conclusions’ and
‘epistemic downplaying’, illustrated in (1) and (2), point to uses of must in which
it seems to have very strong, perhaps maximal, epistemic force:
(1) Deductive conclusions. Elli is looking for her watch. She’s certain it’s in
safe-box A or B. Elli says, My watch is in box A or B. It’s not in A. So it
must be in B. Elli’s must-claim in this conclusion seems perfectly adequate,
and conveys something stronger than, say, So it’s almost certain that the
marble is in B. Why is there a contrast between the must and the almost
certain conclusions?
(2) Epistemic downplaying. Jasmine checked two websites: both say that
it is raining. Jasmine tells Mary There’s no point going outside. It must
be raining. It turns out, however, that it isn’t raining. Mary reproaches
Jasmine, You were wrong! It isn’t raining. Jasmine replies: I wasn’t wrong!
I only said that it MUST be raining. Why does Jasmine’s reply feel odd or
unjustified?
In contrast, ‘evidential uses’ and ‘epistemic tensions’, illustrated in (3) and (4),
capture uses of must in which it seems to convey some degree of epistemic weak-
ness:
1 See, e.g., Swanson (2016); Yalcin (2010); Carr (2015); Moss (2018); Cariani (2016); Lassiter
(2017).
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(3) Evidential uses. Margot is looking out the window and sees that it is
pouring rain. Margot tells Sam, It must be raining outside. Why does this
assertion sound odd? Suppose instead that Margot and Sam are epistemol-
ogists, and their exchange takes place in a seminar on skepticism. Why does
the same assertion now feel acceptable?
(4) Epistemic tensions. Lisa just read on her smart phone that it is rain-
ing, but the stakes are high. Lisa tells James, It must be raining, but it’s
possible/there’s a chance that it isn’t. Why are these epistemic tensions rel-
atively acceptable? Compare, in the same context, the epistemic tension,
It must be raining outside, but it might not be. Why is this odd?
In short, while deductive conclusions and epistemic downplaying suggest that must
is a maximally strong epistemic operator, evidential uses and epistemic tensions
suggest that it is compatible with a limited degree of uncertainty. In what follows,
I will refine and extend these kinds of patterns and use them to discriminate
amongst three prima facie reasonable accounts of the strength of epistemic must
and might. To make the comparisons between theories perspicuous, I will formulate
each account using a uniform probabilistic semantic framework.
The first account is a direct implementation of the traditional modal logic-
inspired view according to which must is a simple necessity and might a bare
possibility epistemic operator (von Fintel and Gillies, 2010, 2021). In a probabilistic
framework, this amounts to the view that, given some body of evidence, must φ
entails that Pr(φ) = 1 while might φ entails that Pr(φ) > 0. This account deals
nicely with basic examples of deductive conclusions (1), epistemic downplaying (2)
and, when suitably modified, also with some basic evidential uses. However, it is
challenged by various kinds of epistemic tensions (4) which suggest that must is
not a maximal and might is not a minimal epistemic operator (§3). For this and
related reasons, I will argue that must is better modeled as non-veridical (‘human’)
necessity and might as practically relevant possibility, as originally emphasized by
Kratzer (1991, 2012).
There are two natural ways of implementing Kratzer’s insight in a probabilis-
tic framework. One is to hold that must φ entails that, given a body of evidence,
Pr(φ) > θmust, where θmust is a high but less than 1 threshold, while might φ
entails that Pr(φ) > 1− θmust. The suggestion, then, is to lower the threshold for
must and increase the one for might relative to the maximal/minimal thresholds
recommended by the traditional approach. This threshold-based account—which
tends to be favored by theorists sympathetic to probabilistic approaches to epis-
temic modals (e.g., Swanson, 2006; Lassiter, 2016, 2017)—deals nicely with ac-
ceptability patterns which suggest that must is not a maximally strong and might
a minimally weak epistemic operator, such as evidential uses (3) and epistemic
tensions (4). Still, I will argue that it has a serious shortcoming (§4). In vari-
ous contexts—incl. (but not limited to) deductive conclusions (1) and epistemic
downplaying (2) (cf. von Fintel and Gillies, 2010, 2021)—it incorrectly predicts
that must-claims should pattern, in terms of acceptability, with overt claims of
high but non-maximal certainty or likelihood.
The second implementation of Kratzer’s insight, unlike the first one, uses a
maximal threshold (= 1) for must and minimal one (> 0) for might, yet weak-
ens must and strengthens might via the stipulation that both include a default
operation which conditionalizes the probability function on a set of contextually
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relevant ‘normality assumptions’, conceived of as reasonable yet (usually) defea-
sible background assumptions or expectations about the world. The goal of this
paper is to show that this conditional non-maximal/minimal account is empir-
ically superior, relative to desiderata (1)-(4) and related variants, to both the
traditional maximal/minimal account and the threshold-based probabilistic non-
maximal/minimal account (§3-§4). In addition, I will show that, when combined
with an independently motivated ‘grammatical’ theory of scalar implicatures, the
conditional account can deal with various challenging extensions of our target
desiderata (§5).2
I should mention three clarifications about the scope and limits of this inves-
tigation. First, the aim of this paper is not to defend probabilistic over quantifi-
cational models of epistemics in general. Accordingly, I focus on cases that help
discriminate between specific probabilisitic accounts, rather than on cases that mo-
tivate the move from quantificational to probabilistic frameworks.3 Second, this
paper is about the ‘strength’ of epistemic must and might. For the most part,
I will remain neutral on questions about the nature of their modals bases, such
as whether they are really epistemic, or whose knowledge/beliefs they represent
(§2.1).4 Third, many influential probabilisitic accounts of epistemics have been de-
fended in conjunction with revisionary semantic frameworks, such as expressivism
and dynamic semantics. In what follows, I adopt instead a truth-conditional im-
plementation, mainly to present and discuss the competing accounts in a familiar
and unified framework (§2.1). Still, most of the novel observations and results of
this paper can inform parallel debates about the ‘strength’ of epistemics in other
semantic frameworks.
2 Probabilistic framework and competing accounts of must and might
This section sets the stage for our discussion by introducing a basic probabilistic se-
mantic framework, some general background assumptions about epistemic modals,
and each of the competing accounts of epistemic must and might, focusing on their
core commitments and predictions.
2 Current theories of must and might in the same broad family as the conditional account
include Kratzer (1981, 1991), Roberts (2015), Moss (2015, 2018) and Del Pinal and Waldon
(2019). Relative to those accounts, this paper attempts to make four novel contributions.
(i) Present an argument against maximal/minimal accounts which includes novel data on
(embedded) epistemic tensions. (ii) Present cases that can be used to discriminate between the
threshold-based and the conditional accounts, ultimately supporting the latter. (iii) Develop
a novel account of the interaction between epistemic auxiliaries and covert exhaustification
operators which improves the predictions of the conditional account relative to our target
desiderata. And (iv) provide empirical support for the unique components/stipulations of the
conditional account.
3 For discussions of the motivation to move from quantificational to probabilistic frameworks,
see Swanson (2006, 2011, 2016); Portner (2009); Yalcin (2010); Lassiter (2015, 2016, 2017);
Moss (2015, 2018); Cariani (2016); Santorio and Romoli (2017), among others.
4 For discussions on the nature of ‘epistemic’ modal bases, see DeRose (1991); Egan et al.
(2004); Stephenson (2007); Yalcin (2007); Portner (2009); Hacquard (2010); MacFarlane
(2011); Dowell (2011); Roberts (2015), among others.
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2.1 Probabilistic framework and background assumptions
To implement a truth-conditional probabilistic semantics, assume that interpre-
tations are relativized to functions e from worlds to epistemic probability spaces
(Yalcin, 2010). An epistemic space is a pair 〈E,Pr〉 of a set of worlds E and a
function Pr. E is a subset of the space of possible worlds W which corresponds to
a set of worlds epistemically accessible from the evaluation world.5 Pr is a function
which assigns to each subset of W a number in [0, 1] satisfying: (i) Pr(E) = 1 and
(ii) if p and q are disjoint, Pr(p ∪ q) = Pr(p) + Pr(q). By relativizing interpreta-
tions to epistemic probability spaces, we can spell out the semantics of epistemic
terms using Pr. In this framework, Ee(w) =
⋂
fe(w) for each world w ∈W , where
fe is an epistemic conversational background such that fe(w) represents what is
known in w. Together with assumption (i), this ensures that the probability den-
sity is in the space determined by a pure epistemic modal base and that we can
model maximal and minimal epistemic operators.6 This implementation is flexible
with respect to whose evidence is represented by modalized assertions, but in the
cases we will focus on, it will usually include the speaker’s evidence.
Suppose that O is a probabilistic propositional (epistemic) operator. Schemat-
ically, the entry for O will look as in (5). This says that O(φ) holds, in w, if the
probability of the prejacent φ in the relevant probabilistic space e(w) is greater
than or equal to the contextually determined threshold for O, where θOc ∈ [0, 1].
(5) JO(φ)Kc,w,e = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e = 1}) ≥ θOc
Using entries like (5), we can model epistemic modals of different strengths via
specific constraints on their contextually determined thresholds. However, we will
add one more parameter to our interpretation function which, following Kratzer
(1981, 2012), I will argue is used by some (perhaps all) epistemic modals. As a
first approximation, this parameter corresponds to a ‘stereotypical conversational
background’ g which picks out, at each world w, a set of ‘normality’ assumptions
which capture general background expectations about the world (once refined,
these functions should also be sensitive to suitable standards as determined by
specific discourse contexts). A schematic entry for a probabilistic operator, O∗,
that uses both relevant evidence and normality assumptions is presented in (6).
Note that eg(w) is obtained from e and conversational background g as follows:
if e(w) = 〈E,Pr〉, then eg(w)(w) := 〈Eg(w), P rg(w)〉, where Eg(w) is defined as⋂
g(w) ∩ E and Prg(w) is defined as Pr conditionalized on
⋂
g(w).7
5 For simplicity, we assume that the set of all possible worlds W is finite.
6 To model maximal and minimal epistemics, an additional assumption is needed. For the
finite spaces under consideration, this amounts to a kind of principle of generality amongst the
worlds compatible with the evidence, namely, for each w ∈W and w′ ∈ Ee(w), Pre(w)(w′) > 0.
This ensures that, when modeling epistemics, the corresponding probabilisitic operators don’t
(implicitly) exclude epistemic possibilities on non-epistemic grounds such as what is simply
believed or assumed.
7 This is based on a simple adaptation of Yalcin (2010)’s probabilistic version of Kratzer’s
semantics for conditionals. The difference is that what is in this case incorporated into the
probabilistic space is not an overt antecedent but a contextually provided set of normality
assumptions about the world, as determined by g. To keep entries like (5) simple, we will
assume that, for each w ∈ W , g(w) picks out a consistent and non-empty set of normality
assumptions.
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(6) JO∗(φ)Kc,w,e,g = 1 iff Preg(w)(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eg(w),g = 1}) ≥ θO
∗
c
This convention allows us to distinguish ‘pure’ epistemic probabilistic operators
from epistemic operators that also incorporate, by default, sets of relevant nor-
mality assumptions about the world. Whether this distinction matters for natural
languages in general, or for modal auxiliaries in particular, is an open question.
Yet it is a distinction that, at this point, we want our framework to capture.
Using this framework, we can now introduce some background assumptions
about particular modal operators. In what follows, we will examine cases that
involve interactions and comparisons between must and might and adjectives such
as certain and possible (among others). To use these cases to constrain theories
of the auxiliaries, we need to make some reasonable initial assumptions—which
can eventually be slightly relaxed—concerning the modal force of these epistemic
adjectives. These are that certain is a maximally strong epistemic operator, as
captured in (7a), and that possible is a strictly minimal epistemic operator, as
captured in (7b).
(7) Strong certain + weak possible:
a. Jcertain φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e,g = 1}) = 1
b. Jpossible φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e,g = 1}) > 0
In both (7a) and (7b), the probability of the prejacent is evaluated relative to the
available evidence, without conditionalizing on normality assumptions—i.e., we





fe(w) picks out a realistic epistemic modal
base such that w ∈
⋂
fe(w)), (7) amounts to using our probabilistic framework to
model certain as an epistemic necessity operator and possible as a bare possibility
operator. To be sure, (7) is not intended as a full semantic account of certain and
possible. Still, there is suggestive evidence, some presented in what follows, that
these terms do have the logical strength captured in (7) (see Lassiter, 2016, 2017;
Santorio and Romoli, 2017; Del Pinal and Waldon, 2019).8
Given this basic framework and background assumptions, let us now describe
the three competing probabilistic accounts of epistemic must and might.
2.2 Maximal/minimal account
The maximal/minimal account is based on the traditional view that must is a
maximally strong epistemic necessity operator and might is a bare possibility one
(von Fintel and Gillies, 2010, 2021). To capture this in a probabilistic framework
we can simply assume that must is (at least) as strong as certain and that might
is (at least) as weak as possible (cf. Rudin, 2016). This proposal is captured in
(8). Proponents of this view need not hold that there is a perfect correspondence
between must and certain, and/or between might and possible. For example, the
8 As discussed in §2.2, one consequence of the entries in (7) is that certain and possible use
the same kind of modal base as must and might. Strictly, we only need to make this assumption
for uses of these adjectives in simple unembedded matrix positions like It is certain/possible
that p. In addition, this assumption is compatible with the view that the epistemic adverbs
certainly and possibly tend to default to more ‘subjective’ modal bases (Lyons, 1977; Nuyts,
2001) and/or are weaker than their adjectival cousins (see Lassiter, 2016).
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auxiliaries and the adjectives might differ in their presuppositions, or along any
other non-truth conditional dimension (cf. Barker, 2009). Accordingly, what is
captured by (8c), strictly speaking, are some of the core Strawson-entailments
which characterize this account, under the assumption that the target epistemic
terms are assigned a uniform modal base.
(8) Maximal/minimal account of must and might :
a. Jmust φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e,g = 1}) = 1
b. Jmight φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e,g = 1}) > 0
c. Strawson-entailments:
(i) must φ |= φ
(ii) must φ |= certain φ
(iii) possible φ |= might φ
(iv) must φ |= ¬possible ¬φ
(v) must φ |= knows φ
According to the account in (8), then, must has maximal and might has minimal
epistemic strength. Since Ee(w) is a realistic modal space, must is modeled as a
veridical operator, and might as a bare possibility one. Now, most theorists who de-
fend probabilistic accounts for must and might don’t defend this maximal/minimal
account, but there are three reasons why we should examine its prospects. First,
this account deals nicely with some of our initial desiderata. For example, since it
models must as maximally strong, it can explain why we can use must in deduc-
tive conclusions, as captured in (1), and why it is hard to downplay an assertion
of must φ when φ turns out to be false, as captured in (2). Second, relative to
the other desiderata in (1)-(4), this account is not as easy to dismiss as is some-
times assumed. In its simplest version, it has trouble explaining the observation,
captured in (3), that it is odd to assert must φ when there is direct evidence for
φ. Yet von Fintel and Gillies (2010) argued that basic evidential patterns can be
explained by assuming, not that must is semantically non-maximal, but rather
that it presupposes that the evidence for φ should be ‘indirect’. Third, even if this
account fails, determining precisely why it does helps ensure that, when evaluating
other accounts, we consider the full range of data that motivated abandoning (8).9
2.3 Threshold-based non-maximal/minimal account
As mentioned earlier, given a probabilistic framework there are two natural ways
of modeling must as a non-maximal and might as a non-minimal epistemic oper-
ator. The first and arguably more popular approach is simply to lower the prob-
ability threshold for must and increase the one for might. This proposal can be
implemented as in (9), which is a simple version of a widely adopted probabilistic
account of the auxiliaries (Swanson, 2006; Lassiter, 2016, 2017). On this view, must
φ entails that the probability of φ, Pr(φ), is above some high but non-maximal
contextually determined threshold θmustc , as in (9a), where we assume that, for
any context c, θmustc < θ
certain
c = 1. It follows that must φ is compatible with the
possibility that ¬φ, as long as Pr(¬φ) < 1 − θmustc , which in turn entails that
must φ is not veridical—i.e., doesn’t entail φ. In addition, by comparing the entry
9 Amongst philosophers, the view that must is a maximally strong and might a bare possi-
bility operator is quite popular and often used as a default hypothesis (see e.g., Yalcin, 2007,
2010; Dorr and Hawthorne, 2013; Stalnaker, 2014; Mandelkern, 2016, 2019).
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for certain in (7a) and the one of must in (9a) we can see that, given this weak
account, certain φ asymmetrically entails must φ. To maintain the standard du-
alities, we hold that might φ entails that Pr(φ) > 1 − θmustc . As a result, might,
defined as in (9b), is stronger than possible, defined as in (7b). The core Strawson
entailments of this account are captured in (9c).
(9) Threshold-based non-maximal/minimal account of must and might :
a. Jmust φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e,g = 1}) > θmustc
b. Jmight φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,e,g = 1}) > 1− θmustc
c. Strawson-entailments:
(i) must φ 6|= φ
(ii) must φ 6|= certain φ
(iii) certain φ |= must φ
(iv) possible φ 6|= might φ
(v) might φ |= possible φ
(vi) must φ 6|= ¬possible ¬φ
This threshold-based account can deal with the kinds of cases that are problematic
for the maximal/minimal account, such as the epistemic tensions illustrated in (4).
The reason for this is that must φ is strictly compatible with the possibility that
¬φ, while we can still assume that must and might are duals, with the result that
might is stronger than a bare possibility operator. The challenge, however, is to
square this view with uses of must that seem maximally strong, as in deductive
conclusions (1) and downplaying scenarios (2) (and parallel cases in which might
seems to function as a bare possibility operator).10
2.4 Conditional non-maximal/minimal account
The conditional non-maximal/minimal account predicts the same entailment pat-
terns between must, might, certain and possible as the threshold-based account
in (9). Yet the implementation is quite different. Specifically, this account fol-
lows the traditional maximal/minimal account in (8) in holding that must and
might involve probabilities 1 and > 0 respectively. To achieve the required log-
ical strength and relations, however, I propose that the auxiliaries, unlike their
adjectival cousins, use an epistemic probability space that is conditionalized on
contextually relevant sets of normality assumptions. From this perspective, must
and might don’t use just a pure epistemic space—they use a space conditionalized
on (possibly non-veridical) normality assumptions, as captured in (10a) and (10b).
Recall that eg(w) is obtained from e and a stereotypical conversational background
g as follows: if e(w) = 〈E,Pr〉, then eg(w)(w) := 〈Eg(w), P rg(w)〉, where Eg(w) is
defined as
⋂
g(w) ∩ E and Prg(w) is defined as Pr conditionalized on
⋂
g(w).
(10) Conditional non-maximal/minimal account of must and might :
a. Jmust φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Preg(w)(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eg(w),g = 1}) = 1
10 Since Kratzer (1981), non-maximal/minimal accounts of must and might have had a signif-
icant following amongst semanticists who use quantificational frameworks (see, e.g., Roberts,
2015; Giannakidou and Mari, 2016). Amongst philosophers, Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) allow
for ‘constrained’ (non-pure) epistemic readings of the auxiliaries, and Willer (2013) develops
a dynamic framework in which might can be modeled as a ‘live possibility’ operator—which
is stronger than just ‘bare possibility’ operator. Using Willer’s framework, one can easily for-
mulate a non-maximal dynamic entry for must.
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b. Jmight φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff Preg(w)(w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eg(w),g = 1}) > 0
c. Strawson-entailments:
(i) must φ 6|= φ
(ii) must φ 6|= certain φ
(iii) certain φ |= must φ
(iv) possible φ 6|= might φ
(v) might φ |= possible φ
(vi) must φ 6|= ¬possible ¬φ
The conditional account in (10) generates the same pattern of Strawson-entailments
between certain, must, might, and possible as the threshold-based account in (9).
So how can we empirically separate these non-maximal/minimal accounts?
To begin to see how these two accounts can be differentiated, let us focus on
their respective entries for must. On the threshold-based account in (9a), must
φ can be paraphrased as ‘φ is almost certain given the contextually relevant ev-
idence’. On the conditional account in (10a), must φ can be paraphrased as ‘φ
is certain given the relevant evidence and some reasonable assumptions about
the world’. This difference can be captured schematically as in (11)-(12). On the
threshold-based account, must is weakened by lowering its threshold relative to
that of certain, as captured in (11). In contrast, on the conditional account, must
is weakened because the probability of its prejacent is determined based on the
relevant evidence and a set of normality assumptions that is a superset of the set of
normality assumptions, if any, used to determine the probability of the prejacent
of certain, as captured in (12).
(11) Threshold-based non-maximal/minimal account:
a. 0 = θpossible < θmight < θmust < θcertain = 1
b. for all w, gposs/cert(w) = gmight/must(w)
(12) Conditional non-maximal/minimal account:
a. 0 = θpossible = θmight < θmust = θcertain = 1
b. for all w, gposs/cert(w) ⊆ gmight/must(w)
To see why this theoretical difference leads to empirical differences, let us zoom in
on the notion of ‘normality assumptions’, as I understand it here. These are back-
ground assumptions that interlocutors take for granted when using evidence to
draw inferences within particular domains. They can include ‘trivial’ assumptions
such as basic (domain general) principles of reasoning, but also substantive ex-
pectations about the world, such as that the basic laws of physics won’t suddenly
change and even that if Google says a store is open at t, that store is open at t.
In everyday contexts, the sets of background assumptions used to draw inferences
from bits of evidence tend to be quite rich, and include assumptions which, as
Kratzer emphasizes, are represented as defeasible.11 To capture this notion of nor-
mality assumptions, I propose the following minimal doxastic constraint (focusing
11 For example, consider a typical every day inference from a set of specific and salient infor-
mation, such as when S infers on the basis of looking in Google maps that some restaurant is
open. This is a typical situation which supports must-claims like McDonald’s must be open—I
just checked Google Maps. The salient evidence includes, roughy, ‘S remembers checking the
schedule for the target McDonald’s restaurant on Google Maps’, ‘Google Maps said that Mc-
Donald’s is open at the relevant time’, and so on. Yet note that the target inference follows
from that specific evidence only given some reasonable (yet strictly defeasible) general back-
ground assumptions about the world such as ‘If Google Maps says that r is open at t, then r
is open at t’, ‘If one has an episodic memory as if p at t, then p happened at t’, and so on.
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here on unembedded modalized expressions12): (i) the normally assumptions that
can be used by a speaker S in context c should have the status of mutually held
beliefs by the relevant interlocutors in c (i.e., they should be taken for granted in
the conversation/deliberation context); and (ii) this does not require that S (or
the interlocutors) be committed to knowing those assumptions—specifically, some
normality assumptions can be explicitly represented as defeasible.13
At this point, we can derive a key difference between certain doxastic entail-
ments of the threshold-based and of the conditional non-maximal/minimal ac-
counts. Given the conditional account and the doxastic constraint on g, an as-
sertion of must φ by S will entail that Bs(φ). To see this, take for concreteness
a knowledge norm of assertion (it is easy to check that weaker norms will also
work, as long as they require full belief). We can then represent S as committed
to Ks(must φ). From Ks(must φ) we can infer that S believes (i) the relevant ev-
idence, (ii) each of the propositions in the relevant set of normality assumptions,
and (iii) that φ follows from (has probability 1 given) (i) and (ii). Premise (ii)
follows from our doxastic constraint on normality assumptions, and premise (iii)
from the semantics of must under the conditional account. From (i)-(iii) it follows
that by asserting must φ, S is committed to Bs(φ).
14
(13) Doxastic entailments of the conditional account:
a. Ks(must φ) |= Bs(φ)
12 In some embedded uses of must—esp. under propositional attitudes—the doxastic con-
straint should be anchored to the relevant subject/s. The details will depend on one’s view of
the interaction between epistemic modals and propositional attitudes. For discussion, see §3.3.
13 The view that normality assumptions have a doxastic but not an epistemic constraint
requires a doxastic and epistemic logic that allows agents to (coherently) reflectively believe
propositions that they do not believe they know. Accordingly, the background logics should
include (i) the distribution axiom for Ki and Bi, (ii) veridicity only for Ki, so that Ki(φ)
asymmetrically entails Bi(φ), and (iii) Bi is weak in the sense that Bi(φ ∧ 3¬φ) should be
consistent, where 3 stands for simple possibility over a modal base anchored to i. There are
various logics for the Ki and Bi-operators that respect (i)-(iii). For example, van Benthem and
Smets (2015) model Bi as a universal quantifier over the ‘most plausible’ worlds of epistemic
spaces. To cohere with our view, we can assume that if gp picks out the premises for a plausi-
bility ordering and g for a stereotypical ordering source, then for each w ∈ W , g(w) ⊆ gp(w),
i.e., plausibility orderings can include more information. From this perspective, although an
assertion by S of must φ entails that Bs(φ), S can consistently acknowledge that it is strictly
possible that ¬φ. As we will see in §3, this ensures that the conditional account can deal with
epistemic tensions in which must φ can be conjoined with the bare possibility that ¬φ. In short,
a relatively weak semantics for Bi allows us to hold that speakers/interlocutors have to be-
lieve, in that sense, the normality assumptions they use even though some of those background
assumptions are explicitly/implicitly represented as defeasible. (For additional evidence that
believe is weak in roughly this sense, see Hawthorne et al. 2016 and Rothschild 2020).
14 On this implementation of the conditional account—i.e., given our conception of normality
assumptions—Bs(φ) doesn’t entail Ks(must φ) or Bs(must φ). This is because not just any
of S’s beliefs count as normality assumptions in a given context c—only those that are part of
the common ground in c, i.e. that have the status of mutually held beliefs. S may hold various
idiosincratic beliefs that S correctly thinks are not part of the common ground—and can’t be
used as background assumptions when reasoning with others about what follows from specific
bits of evidence. This prediction is born out in cases like the following. John is anxiously
waiting for Peter to arrive at the dinner party. John tends to trust his gut feelings, although
he is not so deluded as to think that others would treat his intuitions as reliable indicators.
Someone rings the doorbell, John gets the feeling, and says I believe it’s John, but I wouldn’t
go so far as to say that it must be/it definitely is him. In scenarios like this, these kinds of
epistemic tensions seem quite acceptable.
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In contrast, given the threshold-based account, Ks(must φ) doesn’t entail that
Bs(φ); it only entails that S believes that Pr(φ) > θ
must. This is because S’s
holding that Pr(φ) is greater than an (arbitrarily) high but > 1 threshold doesn’t
guarantee that Bs(φ).
15 For example, consider a fair lottery case of the sort used
to argue against simple ‘Lockean’ theories of belief (Harman, 1986). Suppose John
holds one ticket of a fair lottery, knows that he has a very low chance of winning,
and although the official results have been drawn, doesn’t yet know what they
are. John can then assert that he is ‘almost certain’ he lost, and believe that it is
extremely likely that he lost, without also believing that he lost.
(14) Doxastic entailments of the threshold-based account:
a. Ks(must φ) 6|= Bs(φ)
Ks(must φ) |= Bs(Pr(φ) > θmust)
where θmust can be very high but < 1.
In §4, I present various acceptability patterns which challenge the hypothe-
sis that θmust expresses a high but < 1 threshold. I will argue that, in general,
must-claims just don’t seem to pattern with claims that unambiguously express,
quantitatively or qualitatively, high but non-maximal probability or certainty. In
contrast, the view that must φ expresses something like conditional certainty, and
entails that the speaker believes φ, issues in the right predictions for each of these
challenging patterns. If this argument is successful, and we wish to maintain the
standard dualities, we should in turn favor the conditional over the threshold-based
strategy for increasing the strength of might.
2.5 Interim summary
In this section, I used a simple probabilistic framework to present three prima
facie reasonable hypotheses concerning the strength epistemic must and might,
and spell out, in each case, those of their core entailments and predictions relevant
to desiderata (1)-(4). My goal for the rest of this paper is to defend the conditional
non-maximal/minimal account. I will do this in two steps. The first step (§3)
focuses on cases that undermine the maximal/minimal account and support—but
do not yet discriminate between—the non-maximal/minimal accounts. The second
step (§4) focuses on cases that undermine the threshold-based account and support
the conditional non-maximal/minimal account. If this argument succeeds, I will
have shown that the conditional account is the only one of the three candidates
that can adequately capture the uses of must and might in epistemic tensions,
deductive conclusions, epistemic downplaying, and evidential contexts.
3 Maximal/minimal vs. non-maximal/minimal accounts
This section compares the maximal/minimal account and the non-maximal/minimal
accounts of must and might, focusing on their predictions for various kinds of epis-
temic tensions. I will argue that the observed acceptability patterns support three
15 One could reject this consequence by adopting a simple Lockean theory of belief, such that
θbelieve ≤ θmust, but most would agree that this is a costly move.
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generalizations: (i) certain φ asymmetrically entails must φ, (ii) must φ is strictly
compatible with the bare possibility that ¬φ, and (iii) might φ asymmetrically
entails possible φ. The key cases control for indirectness, hence are problematic
even for maximal/minimal accounts that incorporate an indirectness presupposi-
tion. To support (i)-(iii), we will consider intuitive contrasts (§3.1), experimental
data (§3.2), and embedded epistemic tensions (§3.3).
3.1 Epistemic tensions: Basic cases
According to the maximal/minimal account in (8), must is at least as strong an
epistemic operator as certain. In light of this, consider the examples in (15) (see
Lassiter, 2017, ch. 6). The oddness of (15a) suggests that asserting certain φ com-
mits one to must φ. This is compatible with (8) and our background assumptions
about certain. However, the acceptability of (15b) suggests that we can coherently
assert must φ while being explicitly non-committed to the claim that φ is certain:
(15) Hearing the distinctive engine sound of Mary’s old diesel Volkswagen van...
a. ??I’m certain that’s Mary’s car, though it doesn’t have to be.
b. That must be Mary’s car, though I’m not certain that it is.
Giannakidou and Mari (2016) discuss similar cases where must φ seems to be com-
patible with lack of full certainty in φ, such as (16a). The comparative oddness of
the minimal pair involving knows, in (16b), certain, in (16c), and the unmodalized
bare assertion, in (16d), suggests—against the knowledge and veridicality predic-
tions in (8c) of the maximal/minimal account—that must φ does not entail knows
φ or φ.
(16) a. Ariadne must be sick, but I am not entirely sure.
b. #I know Ariadne is sick, but I am not entirely sure.
c. #I’m certain that Ariadne is sick, but I am not entirely sure.
d. #Ariadne is sick, but I am not entirely sure.
The acceptability patterns in (15) and (16) suggest that certain φ asymmetrically
entails must φ. To further probe this generalization, note that, as Copley (2004)
and Lassiter (2017) point out, constructions of the form p in fact/indeed q are
acceptable if q asymmetrically entails p, but are odd if p entails q:
(17) a. Tom ate most of my cookies—in fact/indeed, he ate all of them.
b. #Tom ate all of my cookies—in fact/indeed, he ate most of them.
Consider then the contrast between (18a) and (18b). While expressions of the
form must φ, in fact/indeed certain φ are acceptable, those of the form certain φ,
in fact/indeed must φ feel more degraded (cf. Lassiter, 2017, ch. 6). The overall
pattern suggests, again, that certain φ asymmetrically entails must φ:
(18) Hearing the distinctive engine sound of Mary’s very old diesel Volkswagen
van...
a. It must be Mary’s car that’s approaching—in fact/indeed, it’s certain
that it is.
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b. ??It’s certain that it’s Mary’s car that’s approaching—in fact/indeed,
it must be.
The p in fact/indeed q construction can also be used to examine whether might is at
least as weak as possible. Given the context in (19), consider the contrast between
(19a) and (19b). While expressions of the form possible φ, in fact/indeed might
φ seem acceptable and convey relevant information (that it is a ‘live’ possibility
that Bill attends the party), those of the form might φ, in fact/indeed possible
φ seem odd or at least comparatively less acceptable. This suggests, contra the
maximal/minimal account, that might φ asymmetrically entails possible φ.
(19) Jamil invites James to his New Year’s party. James says that he wants to
come but under no circumstances wants to run into Bill.
a. Jamil: It’s possible that Bill comes; in fact/indeed, he might come.
b. Jamil: #Bill might come; in fact/indeed, it’s possible that he comes.
Summing up, the patterns in (15)-(18) are in tension with the view that epis-
temic must is a maximally strong epistemic operator, and in particular an operator
that is at least as strong as certain, and those in (19) are in tension with the view
that might is as weak as a bare possibility operator. So those acceptability patterns
amount to suggestive evidence against the maximal/minimal account of must and
might. In contrast, those patterns are expected given the entailments predicted by
the non-maximal/minimal accounts.16
3.2 Epistemic tensions: Experimental evidence
Lassiter (2016, 2017) presents corpus data in which must φ expressions are con-
joined with expressions and contexts that (explicitly) entail that it is strictly pos-
sible that ¬φ. Taken at face value, these cases are in tension with S-entailment
(8c)-(iv) of the maximal/minimal account. Representative examples are presented
in (20):
(20) a. This is a very early, very correct Mustang that has been in a private
collection for a long time . . . the speed[meter] shows 38,000 miles and
it must be 138,000, but I don’t know for sure
b. I have an injected TB42 turbo and like the current setup. There is an
extra injector located in the pipping from the throttle body. Must be
an old DTS setup but I’m not certain. Why would they have added
this extra injector?
Should supporters of strong must be worried by this kind of corpus data? Why
not reply, with von Fintel and Gillies (2021), that ‘people often say the weirdest
things’? More to the point, one could argue that examples like (20a)-(20b) often
16 The p in fact/indeed q test works as intended only if there is independent reason to hold
that p and q are in logical relations with each other (cf. Yalcin, 2016, p. 236-237). Accordingly,
I am not using this test to argue that, say, < must, certain > and < might, possible > stand
in logical relations with each other. Rather, I am assuming that they do so stand, at least
relative to the contexts used above, and use this test to examine hypotheses about what those
relations could be.
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involve mid-discourse changes of mind, expansions/contractions of the modal hori-
zon, and/or uses of must with pragmatic slack (see von Fintel and Gillies, 2010,
2021; Klecha, 2014).
To test this kind of response on behalf of the maximal/minimal account, Del
Pinal and Waldon (2019) performed a series of experiments which generated ac-
ceptability judgments for various epistemic tensions modeled after those in (20).
The aim was to compare various kinds of epistemic tensions, given fixed back-
ground contexts and minimal pairs. In this way, one can determine the relative
strength of different epistemic terms, while controlling for the potential confounds
mentioned above. The stimuli were obtained by combining a vignette scheme like
(21) with one of the experimental conditions (‘epistemic tensions’) in (21a)-(21e):
(21) I just bought a vintage bicycle at a garage sale in my neighborhood. It
will need some work, but it’s in decent shape. epistemic tension here.
The previous owner didn’t know the name of the manufacturer.
a. ‘must φ ∧ possible ¬φ’:
The bike must be from the 60s, but it’s possible that it isn’t.
b. ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’:
The bike must be from the 60s, but it might not be.
c. ‘certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ’:
It’s certain that the bike is from the 60s, but it’s possible that it isn’t.
d. ‘certain φ ∧ might ¬φ’:
It’s certain that the bike is from the 60s, but it might not be.
e. ‘must φ ∧ ¬φ’:
The bike must be from the 60s, but it isn’t.
The overall pattern of results was the following. Tensions of the form ‘must φ
∧ possible ¬φ’ were rated significantly more acceptable than ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’.
The latter tensions, in turn, were rated as indistinguishable from plain baseline
contradictions of the form ‘must φ ∧ ¬φ’. This result, summarized in (22a), un-
dermines prediction (8c)-(iii) of the maximal/minimal account, suggesting instead
that might φ is stronger than possible φ. In addition, tensions of the form ‘must
φ ∧ possible ¬φ’ were rated as significantly more acceptable than those of the
form ‘certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ’, which in turn behaved like the baseline contra-
dictions. This result, summarized in (22b), undermines prediction (8c)-(ii) of the
maximal/minimal account, and suggests instead that certain φ is stronger than
must φ. Importantly, the same pattern of results was observed when the conjuncts
of each epistemic tension appeared in the order shown in (21a)-(21e) (e.g., ‘must
φ ∧ possible ¬φ’) and when they appeared in the reverse order (e.g., ‘possible ¬φ
∧ must φ’).
(22) Results of Del Pinal and Waldon (2019)
(‘x  y’ stands for ‘x was rated as significantly more acceptable than y’):
a. must φ ∧ possible ¬φ  must φ ∧ might ¬φ
b. must φ ∧ possible ¬φ  certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ
Given the experimental set up and controls, we can now ask whether partici-
pants/interlocutors find expressions of the form ‘must φ ∧ possible ¬φ’ acceptable
due to the involvement of ‘pragmatic factors’, broadly construed, such as that
speakers use must with pragmatic slack, and/or undergo a mid-discourse change
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of mind by expanding/contracting their modal horizon (von Fintel and Gillies,
2021; Klecha, 2014). Suppose, following the maximal/minimal account, that must
is at least as strong as certain, and might at least as weak as possible. Crucially, the
pragmatic factors being proposed are, from the participants’ perspective, a kind
of general toolbox for charitable interpretation, used so as to increase the coher-
ence of speakers’ assertions. Accordingly, such factors should increase the degree
of acceptability not only of epistemic tensions of the form ‘must φ ∧ possible ¬φ’
but also of those of the form ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’ and ‘certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ’.
Hence any potential effect of those general pragmatic factors, independent of its
magnitude, can’t explain the substantial differences in the perceived acceptability
of minimal pair tensions with must and certain (e.g., ‘must φ ∧ possible ¬φ’ vs.
‘certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ’ ), and minimal pair tensions with might and possible
(e.g., ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’ vs. ‘must φ ∧ possible ¬φ’). In contrast, the results
come out as expected if we hold, in accordance with the non-maximal/minimal
accounts, that certain φ asymmetrically entails must φ, must φ is non-veridical
(i.e., is strictly compatible with the bare possibility that ¬φ), and might φ asym-
metrically entails possible φ.
To try to salvage at least part of the pragmatic suggestion, proponents of
the maximal/minimal account could argue that epistemic auxiliaries and adjec-
tives differ with respect to their tolerance for pragmatic slack. Indeed, Lasersohn
(1999) discussed examples of truth-conditionally equivalent terms that seem to
differ with respect to their tolerance for slack. Now, to try to explain the results
in (22), one would need to stipulate, specifically, that must is more slack tolerant
than certain. This would help explain why epistemic tensions of the form ‘must φ
∧ possible ¬φ’ are rated as significantly more acceptable than those of the form
‘certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ’. Yet two observations challenge the adequacy of this
stipulation. First, in ordinary discourse, certain is often combined with various
kinds of slack regulators (e.g., ‘totally/absolutely certain’), suggesting that, in its
bare/unmodified form, it allows quite a bit of slack. Second, even when enhanced
with that stipulation, the maximal/minimal account can’t predict the full com-
parative results in (22). For example, we would then expect that tensions of the
form ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’ should feel more acceptable than tensions of the form
‘certain φ ∧ possible ¬φ’. For the target stipulation entails that the former, but
not the latter, could be made coherent by applying slack. Yet tensions of both
forms were rated low in terms of acceptability and, in particular, as unacceptable
as plain contradictions (see Del Pinal and Waldon, 2019).17
It is worth emphasizing that I am not denying that, in the course of assigning
interpretations to utterances, interlocutors often use slack, pragmatic enrichments,
contract or expand the relevant modal horizon, and so on. My claim is rather that
appealing to those sorts of pragmatic factors doesn’t help the maximal/minimal
account explain the comparative acceptability results in (22). In contrast, those
results come out as expected given the non-maximal/minimal accounts.
17 Similarly, we would predict that epistemic tensions of the form ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’ should
be rated as at least as acceptable as tensions of the form ‘must φ ∧ possible ¬φ’. For if use
of slack over must is what rescues the latter from strict incoherence, that same mechanism
should also rescue the former from the same fate. Yet tensions of the form ‘must φ ∧ possible
¬φ’ were rated as substantially more acceptable than those of the form ‘must φ ∧ might ¬φ’.
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3.3 Embedded epistemic tensions
Yalcin (2007) argues that ‘relational’ views of epistemics such as Kratzer (1981,
1991) predict that (23a) should have a reading roughly paraphrasable as (23b).
Yet unlike (23b), (23a) feels resiliently odd or incoherent.
(23) a. # Mary supposes/imagines that it’s raining and it might not be.
b. Mary supposes/imagines that it’s raining and she doesn’t know that
it is.
This contrast has been used to try to motivate more or less radical departures
from standard accounts of epistemics and propositional attitudes.18 Our focus
here is on debates specifically about the strength of must and might, and will ap-
peal to these and similar cases of embedded epistemic tensions to make a different
point. I will argue that even if the maximal/minimal and non-maximal/minimal
accounts are paired with a plausible account of the interaction between proposi-
tional attitudes and modal operators that can explain the contrast in (23), only
the non-maximal/minimal accounts make the correct predictions for a range novel
variations of similar embedded epistemic tensions.
As Anand and Hacquard (2013) point out, one way to explain the contrast
in (23) is to hold that propositional attitudes affect modal spaces in their scope.
Following that lead, I will adopt a semantic account of the oddness of (23a)—
adapting a recent suggestion by Ninan (2018). Consider the entry in (24a), where
eSx(w) stands for a probabilistic space that captures what x supposes in w,
and eS
w
x ( ) stands for a ‘rigidified’ suppositional probabilistic space: for any w′,
eS
w
x (w′) = eSx(w). Given (24a) and any of our candidate entries for might (i.e.,
(8b), (9b), or (10b)), suppose (φ and might ¬φ) comes out as incoherent, i.e., as
trivially false. To see this, consider the truth-conditions in (24b). For the first con-
junct to come out true, PreSx (w) has to assign probability 1 to the set of φ worlds.
Crucially, suppose rigidifies the probabilistic space in its scope, which is the one
used by the embedded might. It follows that, for all worlds w′ accessible from w,
PreSx (w) = PreSwx (w′). This entails that, in PreSwx (w′′), the ¬φ worlds are assigned
probability 0, so the second conjunct comes out false.
(24) a. Jx supposes φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff PreSx (w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eS
w
x ,g = 1}) = 1
b. Jx supposes (φ and might ¬φ)Kc,w,e,g = 1 iff
PreSx (w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eS
w
x ,g = 1}) = 1 ∧
PreSx (w)({w′′ : Jmight ¬φKc,w
′′,eS
w
x ,g = 1}) = 1
In short, given the revised entry for suppose in (24a), which shifts the probabilis-
tic space in its scope so as to match what is supposed in the evaluation world,
we get a purely semantic explanation for the oddness of (23b), namely, that it is
trivially false.19 This holds for similar attitudes (e.g., thinks) and any reasonable
18 For discussion, see Anand and Hacquard (2013); Dorr and Hawthorne (2013); Roberts
(2015); Giannakidou and Mari (2016); Ninan (2018).
19 To get a semantic account of the oddness of (23b), why do we appeal to ‘rigidified’ prob-
abilistic spaces? Consider the entry in (i), where eSx (w) stands for a probabilistic space that
captures what x supposes in w, and in which we don’t further rigidify the probabilistic space
used by the modal in the scope of the attitude. Given (ia) and any reasonable entry for might, x
supposes (φ and might ¬φ) comes out as consistent. This can be seen from the truth-conditions
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probabilistic account of might. That is, our competing accounts all predict that
(23a), given the analysis in (24b), is trivially false, hence should feel odd or in-
coherent.20 Accordingly, contrasts like (23a)-(23b)—the ones usually discussed in
the literature—do not directly inform debates about the strength of the epistemic
auxiliaries.
Yet the predictions of the maximal/minimal and the non-maximal/minimal
accounts can be distinguished for certain variants of the standard cases of embed-
ded epistemic tensions. Specifically, we should examine any potential contrasts in
acceptability between expressions of the forms in (25a)-(25c):21
(25) a. x supposes/thinks (φ ∧ might ¬φ)
b. x supposes/thinks (must φ ∧ might ¬φ)
c. x supposes/thinks (must φ ∧ possible ¬φ)
Assuming the previous ‘shifty’ account of attitudes like suppose/thinks, all of our
competing accounts predict that instances of (25a) should come out as incoherent,
hence should feel odd. The same applies to instances of (25b), since they all treat
must and might as duals. Our competing accounts differ, however, in their pre-
dictions for instances of (25c). Accounts which treat must as a maximally strong,
veridical operator (cf. Yalcin, 2007; von Fintel and Gillies, 2010; Anand and Hac-
quard, 2013; Ninan, 2018), predict that instances of (25c) are also incoherent, hence
should feel roughly as odd as (25a) and (25b). In contrast, non-maximal/minimal
accounts predict that such attitudes can coherently admit conjunctions of must φ
with the bare possibility that ¬φ (e.g., when one supposes that one’s evidence and
normality assumptions entail φ, but that one’s evidence on its own doesn’t strictly
entail φ). On this view, instances of (25c), unlike (25a)-(25b), can be strictly co-
herent, hence should feel felicitous or at least significantly less odd.
in (ib), which are satisfied in the following situation: x supposes that φ in w, so the first con-
junct comes out as true, and in addition, x supposes that, in each world compatible with what
x supposes in w, x is agnostic about φ, so the second conjunct also comes out as true.
(i) a. Jx supposes φKc,w,e,g = 1 iff PreSx (w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eSx ,g = 1}) = 1
b. Jx supposes (φ and might ¬φ)Kc,w,e,g = 1 iff
PreSx (w)({w′ : JφKc,w
′,eSx ,g = 1}) = 1 ∧
PreSx (w)({w′′ : Jmight ¬φKc,w
′′,eSx ,g = 1}) = 1
The reason why, given these assumptions, x supposes (φ and might ¬φ) has a consistent reading
is this: although a semantic effect of suppose is to shift e to eSx , still PreSx ( ) can determine a
different probability measure at the evaluation world w and at any world w′ compatible with
what is supposed at w. As a result, if we combine any of the entries for might in §2 with
an entry for suppose as in (ia), the oddness of (23b) would have to be given a non-semantic
explanation (for attempts, see Roberts, 2015; Dorr and Hawthorne, 2013).
20 This account correctly predicts that expressions like x supposes (φ and x doesn’t know φ)
can have coherent readings. This follows from the stipulation that propositional attitudes like
suppose/imagines/knows shift the modal space over which they are defined (hence they can
also do this when embedded under other attitudes). For a related discussion, see Anand and
Hacquard (2013).
21 As Anand and Hacquard (2013) argue, some propositional attitudes—e.g., hope and
doubt—seem to admit possibility but not (weak) necessity epistemic modals. However, at-
titudes like imagine/suppose/think/believe seem to admit both kinds of epistemic modals. For
example, John supposes that it must be raining is acceptable (and arguably subtly different in
meaning compared to John supposes that it is raining).
18 Guillermo Del Pinal
Non-maximal/minimal accounts of must and might make the right predictions
in these kinds of cases. This is easiest to see if we focus on examples in which
both embedded conjuncts can be naturally seen as addressing a question under
discussion. Consider the context in (26). While the embedded epistemic tension
with must φ ∧ might ¬φ, in (26b), is distinctly odd, the corresponding tension with
must φ ∧ possible/slight chance ¬φ, in (26a), feels markedly better. In addition,
the embedded tensions with the bare prejacent, φ ∧ possible/slight chance ¬φ, in
(26c), are also distinctly worse than (26a). The same applies to (26d), although
there is perhaps a slight improvement in this case.
(26) The available evidence is in: it strongly suggests that Cain is the murderer.
In this country, the judge has to make a verdict and issue a sentence.
a. The judge thinks that although Cain must be the murderer, it strictly
possible/there is slight chance that he isn’t. So she won’t go for the
maximum sentence.
b. #The judge thinks that although Cain must be the murderer, he
might not be. So she won’t go for the maximum sentence.
c. # The judge thinks that although Cain is the murderer, it is strictly
possible/there is a slight chance that he isn’t. So she won’t go for the
maximum sentence.
d. ??The judge thinks that although it is certain that Cain is the mur-
derer, it strictly possible/there is slight chance that he isn’t. So she
won’t go for the maximum sentence.
When considering events like court decisions, it is natural to acknowledge that one
has to appeal, not just to evidence, but also to (defeasible) normality assumptions
about the world, which can introduce uncertainty even in the best cases. These
kinds of examples suggest, contra the maximal/minimal yet in accordance with
the non-maximal/minimal accounts, that expressions of the form x supposes/thinks
(must φ and possible ¬φ) are strictly acceptable.
A similar point can be made with a different kind of construction, where we
embed just one of the conjuncts, with the goal of trying to increase the informativ-
ity of the corresponding epistemic tension. As Anand and Hacquard (2013) argue,
x hopes φ entails that φ is at least a bare possibility for x and that x prefers φ
to ¬φ. From this perspective, epistemic tensions of the form x hopes φ ∧ must
¬φ, in contexts where the epistemic perspective for must is anchored to x, should
be acceptable only if must is non-maximal. This prediction is confirmed by the
acceptability of expressions like (27a-i)-(27a-ii) relative to the context in (27). In
contrast, the acceptability of (27a-i)-(27a-ii), given the comparative oddness of
(27b)-(27d), is hard to explain on maximal accounts according to which must φ
(Strawson) entails any of φ, know φ, or certain φ.22
(27) At half time, Liverpool was beating Arsenal 6-0. Its a knock out round, no
draws—there has to be a winner. Two disappointed Arsenal fans, Lisa and
James, left the stadium at half-time. The game is now likely over. James
22 I argued in §2.4 that an assertion by S of must φ typically entails that BS(φ). That result
does not conflict with the current explanation of the acceptability of (27a); for recall that we
modeled BS(φ) as just requiring that φ hold in all of the most plausible worlds. Indeed, in a
context like (27), I hope Arsenal won, but I believe they lost feels quite acceptable. For further
discussion, see §5.2.
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wonders out loud whether they should walk to a bar and check the final
score. Lisa replies:
a. There is no point....
(i) I hope Arsenal won, but they must have lost.
(ii) Although I hope Arsenal won, they must have lost.
b. There is no point...
(i) #I hope Arsenal won, but they lost.
(ii) # Although I hope Arsenal won, they lost.
c. There is no point...
(i) #I hope Arsenal won, but I know they lost.
(ii) # Although I hope Arsenal won, I know they lost.
d. There is no point...
(i) ??I hope Arsenal won, but I’m certain they lost.
(ii) ??Although I hope Arsenal won, I’m certain they lost.
Summing up, we have seen that, when combined with a suitable semantics
for attitudes like suppose and think, probabilisitic accounts of must and might
predict the kinds of contrasts observed by Yalcin (2007) and others. What is crucial
for us, however, is that, in contrast to the maximal/minimal account, the non-
maximal/minimal accounts correctly predict that embedded epistemic tensions
which conjoin must φ with possible ¬φ (or with any other expression, such as
hope ¬φ, that entails the bare possibility that ¬φ) should come out as strictly
acceptable and have coherent readings. We have explored suggestive evidence,
based on patterns like (26) and (27), that this prediction is borne out.
4 Threshold-based vs. conditional non-maximal/minimal accounts
So far, we have examined the predictions of the maximal/minimal and the non-
maximal/minimal accounts of must and might relative to the acceptability pat-
terns generated by various kinds of epistemic tensions. I have argued that those
patterns support the non-maximal/minimal accounts: certain φ asymmetrically
entails must φ, must φ doesn’t entail knows φ or φ, must φ is compatible with the
strict possibility that ¬φ, and might φ is stronger than possible φ. Those results,
however, do not discriminate between the threshold-based and the conditional ac-
count. This section focuses on acceptability patterns that can discriminate between
those two non-maximal/minimal accounts. The target patterns involve deductive
conclusions, contexts of risk, and downplaying scenarios. Although some of these
cases have been used to argue against non-maximal/minimal accounts in general, I
will argue that, in general, they present a greater challenge to the threshold-based
than to the conditional account.
4.1 Deductive conclusions
von Fintel and Gillies (2010) point out that must-claims can be used felicitously
in conclusions of deductions, as illustrated in (28a) and (29a), and argue that
this is problematic for non-maximal accounts. Suppose must φ didn’t entail φ, or
that φ is certain, then shouldn’t these uses be pragmatically odd? For using a
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must-claim as a deductive conclusion would imply or suggest a weaker conclusion
than that entailed by the common-ground when updated with the premises of
the argument. Indeed, deductive conclusions hedged with expressions of high but
non-maximal probability, such as (28b) and (29b), feel odd and do not seem like
correct paraphrases of the corresponding must-claims.
(28) The ball is in A or in B. It’s not in A.
a. So it must be in B.
b. ??So it’s almost certain that it is in B.
(29) If x is prime and even, then x is 2. x is prime and x is even.
a. So x must be 2.
b. ??So it is at least 98% likely that x is 2.
This objection is most convincing against accounts which stipulate that must
is cross-contextually non-maximal, such as the threshold-based account in (9a).
For instance, Lassiter (2016, 2017) defends a version of (9) that allows θmust to
vary between values that are high—albeit non-maximal—so long as, at each con-
text, the following condition is satisfied: θlikely < θmust < θcertain ≤ 1.23 The
challenge for this account is that, when combined with standard views on scalar
implicatures, it arguably predicts that an assertion of must φ will tend to generate
an upper-bounded implicature—roughly, that the speaker S was not in a position
to make the stronger assertion that φ. If triggered in a deductive conclusion, this
implicature would clash with the common ground entailment that the assertion of
the bare prejacent was warranted. As a result, must φ conclusions would, in such
contexts, be incorrectly predicted to feel odd.
The conditional account, however, allows for felicitous uses of must-claims in
deductive conclusions. I will only sketch my argument here, I will refine and defend
it in §5.2, after presenting a detailed account of the interaction between epistemic
modals and implicatures. According to the conditional account, must-claims con-
cern what follows from the evidence, given certain background assumptions. In
everyday contexts, such as deciding, from a specific bit of evidence such as the in-
formation in a website, whether a store is open, or whether it will be sunny on the
weekend, we use relatively rich sets of normality assumptions, which may include
assumptions that we represent as defeasible. But when drawing logical inferences
from explicit premises, or whenever the goal is to draw inferences that are at least
as secure as the premises, we use few, if any, non-trivial background assumptions.
In these contexts, speakers can usually be represented as not only believing but
also as being certain about their background assumptions. Since the conditional
account entails that, for all contexts, θmustc = 1, instead of high but < 1, uses of
must φ in contexts that call on normality assumptions held with certainty will not
entail or implicate any degree of epistemic weakness or lack of certainty.
As they are currently formulated, then, the conditional account is in a better
position than the threshold-based account to deal with patterns like (28)-(29).
At the same time, we shouldn’t overstate the force of this objection. First, it is
easy to revise the threshold-based account so as to block the problematic upper-
23 Some quantificational accounts also stipulate that, in its epistemic use, must φ is cross-
contextually weak: e.g., Giannakidou and Mari (2016) hold that must φ presupposes that φ
does not hold in all the worlds of the epistemic modal base, and asserts that φ holds in all of
the ‘best’ worlds of the epistemic modal base.
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bounded implicatures in deductive contexts. Simply reformulate it so as to allows
for the possibility that, in some contexts c, θmustc = θ
certain
c = 1. This can be done
by replacing (11) with (30). One can then add that a class of contexts in which
the maximal threshold will be typically selected, are precisely contexts where the
interlocutors are interested in drawing deductive inferences.
(30) a. 0 = θpossible ≤ θmight < θmust ≤ θcertain = 1
b. for all w, gposs/cert(w) = gmight/must(w)
Secondly, Giannakidou (1999) and Goodhue (2017) argue, based on cross-linguistic
evidence, that must-conclusions in deductions are not really epistemic. Advocates
of the threshold-based account could try to defend that hypothesis. A third option,
presented by Lassiter (2016), is open to threshold-based accounts which stipulate
that must includes a lexicalized evidential signal. In this case, a hearer might
(pragmatically) reason from S’s assertion of must φ—in, say, a deductive context—
that S did not assert bare φ because S intended to emphasize its evidential status,
rather than because S was uncertain about φ given the premises. Whether any of
these avenues prove promising, we clearly need additional evidence to discriminate
between the threshold-based and the conditional accounts.
4.2 Risk in normal worlds
Yalcin (2016) presents contexts involving risk in which expressions with matrix
‘weak necessity modals’ in their epistemic reading—e.g., with should and ought—
are odd whereas minimal variants with operators that explicitly convey high but
non-maximal certainty/likelihood are acceptable. A representative context of this
kind is presented in (31). Expressions with epistemic modals which explicitly con-
vey high but non-maximal certainty/likelihood in the prejacent, such as (31a)-
(31c), are acceptable in this context. In contrast, close variants with weak necessity
modals are odd, as illustrated in (31d). Extending Yalcin’s pattern, I add the ob-
servation that, in contexts like (31), must clearly patterns with the weak necessity
modals, as can be seen by the oddness of (31e).
(31) Suppose an urn has 100 marbles, 95 white and 5 black. One marble is
drawn at random and the speaker doesn’t yet know what color was drawn.
a. It is likely that the marble drawn is white.
b. It is almost certain that the marble drawn is white.
c. It is 95% certain/likely that the marble drawn is white.
d. ??The marble drawn should/ought to be white.
e. ??The marble drawn must be white.
This kind of pattern is problematic for the threshold-based account in (9).
For on this view, must φ expresses high but non-maximal degree of likelihood or
certainty that φ. So why are must-claims odd in contexts like (31) that involve
a known but small risk in the prejacent? Contexts like (31) admit both quanti-
tative and qualitative expressions of a high but non-maximal degree of certainty
or likelihood, as shown by the acceptability of (31a)-(31c). Thus, that contexts
like (31) don’t also admit must-claims like (31e) undermines accounts of epistemic
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must that model it as semantically expressing something akin to ‘almost certain’
or ‘very likely’.
In contrast, the comparative oddness of must-claims like (31e), in contexts like
(31), can be easily explained by the conditional account in (10). According to this
account, although must-claims involve probability 1, they often have non-maximal
epistemic status because they include prior conditionalization on normality as-
sumptions. The key observation, concerning contexts like (31), is that there are
no (salient/relevant/natural) background assumptions about the world such that,
once the available evidence is conditionalized on those assumptions, it follows that
the likelihood of drawing a white marble is 1. That is, the default background
assumptions in a context like (31) will usually include information like ‘the draws
from the urn are fair’, ‘the likelihood of drawing any marble is 1/100’ and so on,
and conditional on those normality assumptions, the likelihood of drawing a white
marble is 95/100. This is precisely what the context makes explicit. Accordingly,
the oddness of (31e) can be attributed to a clash between that common ground and
what would be required to accommodate the must-claim (namely, that assuming
the world is as expected—i.e., that the lottery is fair and so on—the likelihood of
drawing white is 100/100).
To further probe the conditional account, consider the context in (32). (32) is
similar to (31) in that the chance that a white marble was picked is very high but
there is still some small risk. The difference is that in (32) the draw is executed
by a reliable robot designed to pick just the white marbles. The key observation is
that, unlike (31), this context admits explicit expressions of high but non-maximal
certainty/likelihood and minimal variants with should and must, as shown by the
acceptability of (32a)-(32c).
(32) Suppose an urn has half white and half black marbles. State of the art,
reliable robots have been designed to pick out marbles of specific colors
from urns—‘R-Whites’ pick out white marbles and ‘R-Blacks’ pick our
black marbles. A robot has drawn a marble but the speaker doesn’t yet
know what color was drawn. The speaker then finds out that the marble
was picked by an R-White.
a. It is very likely/almost certain that the marble drawn was white.
b. The marble drawn should be white.
c. The marble drawn must be white.
Why can we say, in contexts like (32), that the marble drawn ‘must’ be white,
even if we implicitly/explicitly believe that such state of the art robots, although
exquisitely crafted, are not strictly functionally perfect, that is, even if, as in
(31), there is a risk (that R-White picked a black marble)? The difference is
that in (32)—but not in (31)—there is a suitable set of contextually relevant
and salient normality assumptions. Obvious candidates—commonly used in every
day reasoning—would include background assumptions like ‘state of the art ar-
tifacts perform their intended function’. Given the evidence and conditional on
those normality assumptions, the probability that the marble was white is 1. As
a result, the conditional account correctly predicts that must-claims are licensed
in contexts like (32). Furthermore, the conditional account, in contrast to the
threshold-based one, makes this prediction without also over-generating accept-
ability for must-claims in contexts like (31), which involve some degree of risk
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even if we only consider the worlds compatible with both the salient evidence and
the background normality assumptions.
It is worth reflecting on why the threshold-based and conditional accounts
make different predictions about the degree of acceptability of must-claims across
contexts like (31) and (32). According to the threshold-based account, in contexts
where the evidence entails that θmust < Pr(φ) < 1 (i.e., that Pr(φ) is sufficiently
high but non-maximal), assertions of must φ should, in general, feel appropriate—
indeed, as appropriate as assertions of very/n% likely φ and almost/n% certain
φ (for sufficiently high yet non-maximal choices for n). In contrast, according to
the conditional account, we should distinguish between two kinds of contexts in
which the evidence entails that Pr(φ) is high but non-maximal. In contexts of the
first kind, illustrated by (31), the small but non-zero risk (captured by Pr(¬φ))
remains after conditionalizing on salient normality assumptions which capture
general expectations about the world. In contexts of the second kind, illustrated
by (32), the small risk is eliminated after conditionalizing on a suitable set of
normality assumptions. The conditional account predicts that while expressions
like very/n% likely φ and almost/n% certain φ can be used appropriately in both
kinds of contexts, must φ is only strictly appropriate in the latter kinds of contexts,
where the small but non-zero risk is eliminated after conditionalizing on a salient
set of normality assumptions.
Interestingly, there is a type of objection, commonly presented as against ‘non-
maximal’ accounts of must in general, which we can at this point show is effective
only against the threshold-based account. The objection appeals to odd uses of
must φ in situations that are structurally like (31)—i.e., where given the evidence
and normality assumptions the probability that φ is still high but < 1. Here
is an example presented by von Fintel and Gillies (2021). Take a situation like
(33). Given those facts, an insurance company trying to minimize its costs may
formulate a policy a rule as in (33a) but not as in the odd variant in (33b):
(33) To establish whether a patient has a particular disease D there are two
tests. T1 is cheap but not always definitive: it can indicate that the patient
has D but often it merely indicates that the patient is more or less likely
to have D. Test T2 is definitive, but much more expensive than A.
a. T2 can only be administered if the results of T1 are that it is not
certain that the patient p has D but that p likely has it.
b. #T2 can only be administered if the results of T1 are that it is not
certain that the patient p has D but that p must have it.
This contrast is puzzling for the threshold-based view. For according to this view,
(33b) would arguably just convey something like (33a): namely, that T2 may be
used only when T1 gives the result that it is not certain but it is likely that the
patient has D, except that the relevant threshold for must may be higher than
the one for very likely. In contrast, according to the conditional account, it is easy
to see why (33b) is odd. In the situation relevant to allowing the use of T2, the
result of T1 is inherently risky, i.e., is risky even under the assumption that T1
is functioning normally (structurally, this is like the probability of losing in a fair
lottery draw when you hold, say, one ticket out of a hundred). Yet when the rule
is formulated as in (33b), it is says that T2 can be used when the result of T1 is
that it is not certain unconditionally that the patient has D, but that it is certain
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conditional on assumptions such as that T1 is working properly. That is obviously
inconsistent with how T1 is assumed to function—given the common ground in
(33)—in situations when it gives high-likelihood but non-certain result.
Summing up, the conditional account, but not the threshold-based one, cor-
rectly predicts an interesting contrast in the acceptability of must-claims across
contexts where there is a small chance or risk that the prejacent is false. The con-
trast is that, in general, must-claims are odd in contexts that are inherently risky
or uncertain, yet they are acceptable in contexts in which a comparable level of risk
or uncertainty can be eliminated by conditionalizing on normality assumptions.
4.3 Downplaying scenarios
‘Downplaying scenarios’, illustrated in (34), consist of simple dialogues in which
(i) a speaker S makes a modal claim whose prejacent turns out to be false, (ii)
S is accused of having made a false assertion, and (iii) S replies by insisting that
the original modal claim was strictly speaking correct. The key observation, due
to von Fintel and Gillies (2010), is that when the prejacent turns out to be false,
downplaying a previous assertion of very high but non-maximal probability or cer-
tainty, as in (34c), is an acceptable conversational move. In contrast, downplaying
a previous must-claim, when its prejacent turns out to be false, is distinctively
odd and arguably unacceptable, as illustrated in (35b).
(34) a. Jasmine: [after checking Google] It’s almost/98% certain that its rain-
ing.
b. Kate: [opens curtains] Not it isn’t. You were wrong.
c. Jamine: Well, strictly speaking, I was not wrong. I was careful. I only
said that it’s almost/98% certain that it’s raining.
(35) a. Jasmine: [after checking Google] It must be raining.
b. Kate: [opens curtains] Not it isn’t. You were wrong.
c. Jasmine: #Well, strictly speaking, I was not wrong. I was careful. I
only said that it must be raining.
The contrast between (34c) and (35c) is unexpected given views, such as the
threshold-based account in (9), which model must φ as being roughly semantically
equivalent in force to expressions of high but non-maximal certainty or likelihood
that φ. To see why, continue to assume, for concreteness, a knowledge norm of
assertion. From this perspective, intuitions about the justifiability of downplaying
claims should reflect the following pattern: the stronger the original modalized
claim, the less justified it is to subsequently downplay it if the prejacent turns
out to be false. Now, according to the threshold-based account, must φ entails
that the likelihood of φ is above some high but non-maximal threshold. It follows
that, in otherwise matching contexts, downplaying a previous assertion that must
φ should be roughly as acceptable as downplaying a previous assertion of high
but non-maximal certainty in φ. Yet this prediction is undermined by the contrast
between (34c) and (35c).
Proponents of the threshold-based non-maximal account of must, however, have
denied that the alleged contrast in (34)-(35) captures a general pattern. For ex-
ample, Lassiter (2016) reports that downplaying the high certainty claim in (34c)
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feels (roughly) as unacceptable as downplaying the must-claim in (35c). To re-
solve this disagreement concerning the patterns observed in these cases, Del Pinal
and Waldon (2019) designed a series of experiments to obtain acceptability judg-
ments for various downplaying scenarios. The results unambiguously corroborated
von Fintel and Gillies (2010, 2021)’s original intuition: across a range of different
stimuli, conditions that involved downplaying claims of very high but non-maximal
certainty, such as (34c), were rated as significantly more acceptable than matching
conditions that involved downplaying must-claims, such as (35c).
Proponents of the threshold-based account of must could respond as follows.
Asserting an expression of the form ‘n% certain that φ’, where n% is a high but
non-maximal probability, tends to generate the upper-bounded implicature that
‘¬m% certain that φ’, for any m,n such that m > n. In contrast, although must
is also non-maximal, it does not have a stronger scale-mate; as a result, asserting
that must φ does not, in general, generate a parallel upper-bounded implicature.
Continue to assume that the weaker the original modalized claim, the easier/more
justified it is to subsequently downplay it when its prejacent turns out to be
false. It follows that if the ‘n% certain that φ’ condition (tends to) generate upper
bounded implicatures, whereas the ‘must φ’ condition doesn’t, we can explain why
it is easier to downplay in the former case, even if we hold that truth-conditionally
both conditions express high but non-maximal probability in φ.
Del Pinal and Waldon (2019) designed an experiment to test this response. The
target stimuli are like (34)-(35), but with two important manipulations. First, in
one condition the ‘n% certain that φ’ sentences were replaced with ‘at least n%
certain that φ’ (where n% stands for a high but non-maximal probability). The ‘at
least’ modification was introduced to block potential upper bounded implicatures
(see Krifka, 1999; Mayr, 2013). Second, in all the conditions the bare prejacent
was mentioned immediately before the downplaying sentence. This was done to
increase the likelihood that the bare prejacent would be seen as a salient alternative
of the modalized claim (see Katzir, 2014). The resulting conditions are illustrated
in (36).
(36) a. ‘n% certain’ condition:
. . . Well, strictly speaking, I was not wrong. . . I didn’t say that it
is/was raining. I only said that it’s 98% certain that it’s raining.
b. ‘at least n% certain’ condition:
. . . Well, strictly speaking, I was not wrong. . . I didn’t say that it
is/was raining. I only said that it’s at least 98% certain that it’s
raining.
c. ‘must’ condition:
. . . Well, strictly speaking, I was not wrong. . . I didn’t say that it
is/was raining. I only said that it must be/have been raining.
The original pattern of results was replicated under these manipulations, as sum-
marized in (37). Downplaying in the ‘n% certain’ and in the ‘at least n% certain’
conditions was rated as roughly equally acceptable. In addition, downplaying in
each of those conditions was rated as significantly more acceptable than down-
playing in the ‘must’ condition.
(37) Results of Del Pinal and Waldon (2019) (‘x  y’ := ‘x was rated as a
significantly more justified downplaying move than y’):
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‘n% certain’ condition ≈ ‘at least n% certain’ condition  ‘must’
condition
This pattern of results presents a serious challenge to the threshold-based account
according to which must φ means, roughly, that the probability of φ given the
evidence is (very) high but non-maximal. Even when we control for potential
upper-bounded implicatures, must-claims turn out to be significantly harder to
downplay than matching claims of very high but non-maximal certainty.
In contrast, the pattern of results in (37) is predicted by the conditional ac-
count. According to this account, must φ says that φ follows with maximal prob-
ability given the salient evidence and a set of relevant normality assumptions. In
everyday dialogues like (34) and (35), background normality assumptions include
information like ‘if Google says it is m at l, then it is m at l’. These are (defeasible)
assumptions that interlocutors believe, or take for granted, in certain deliberation
and conversational contexts, and which they use to draw inferences from specific
bits of information such as that Google says that it is raining in Chicago or Atlanta
at a particular time. Due to the doxastic constraint on normality assumptions, it
follows, as shown in §2.4, that an assertion of must φ by speaker S commits S
to believing the bare prejacent—i.e., to BS(φ). In contrast, asserting almost/n%
certain φ only commits S to believing that φ has a high likelihood, given the ev-
idence, but doesn’t entail any full or unhedged doxastic commitment to φ. Given
this difference in the strength of their doxastic entailments, and the reasonable
principle that the stronger a claim, the harder it is to subsequently downplay it,
it follows that assertions of must φ should be harder to downplay than assertions
of almost/n% certain φ—which is precisely what we observe in the results in (37).
4.4 Where do we stand?
Let us summarize the argument for the conditional non-maximal/minimal account.
In §3, I argued that the predictions of the maximal/minimal account conflict with
the acceptability patterns associated with various kinds of epistemic tensions,
which suggest that must is not a maximal and might is not a minimal (‘bare
possibility’) epistemic operator, as assumed by the two non-maximal/minimal ac-
counts. Next, in §4, I presented cases that aim to discriminate between between
the threshold-based and the conditional non-maximal/minimal accounts. I argued
that the conditional account is in a better position to make sense of the following
three observations. First, unlike explicit, unambiguous claims of high but non-
maximal probability or certainty, must-claims can be used as deductive conclu-
sions. Second, in cases that involve a small risk or uncertainty given the evidence,
must-claims do not pattern with—and are more selective in certain specific ways
than—claims of high but non-maximal probability or certainty. Third, when the
prejacent turns out to be false, downplaying previous must-claims is significantly
harder than downplaying claims of high but non-maximal probability or certainty.
To complete my argument for the conditional account, we need to discuss one
more desiderata—evidential uses of the epistemic auxiliaries.
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5 Evidential uses
Basic evidential uses of must are illustrated by patterns like (38)-(39), where the
key observation, captured in (39a), is that it is odd to assert It must be raining
outside if the speaker is directly observing that it is raining at the relevant location:
(38) Ann and Jasmine are deciding whether to go out. Ann sees people coming
in carrying wet umbrellas.
a. Ann: It must be raining outside. We should stay in.
b. Ann: It is raining outside. We should stay in.
(39) Ann and Jasmine are deciding whether to go out. Ann looks out the window
and sees that it is pouring rain.
a. Ann: #It must be raining outside. We should stay in.
b. Ann: It is raining outside. We should stay in.
Despite their popularity in the literature, it is not easy to determine precisely
how—or even whether—evidential uses bear on debates about the strength of must
and might. For when suitably supplemented, both maximal/minimal and non-
maximal/minimal accounts cohere reasonable well with basic evidential patterns
like those in (38)-(39). Here’s a sketch of two popular supplementations, the first
based on scalar implicatures and the second on the stipulation of an ‘indirectness’
presupposition:
– If must is non-maximal, by asserting It must be raining instead of It is raining,
Ann implies that she doesn’t yet know (or is justified in asserting) that it is
raining, or that she isn’t really certain that it is raining. Those implicatures are
compatible with the sort of non-definitive indirect evidence which is part of the
common ground in (38), so (38a) is felicitous. In contrast, since interlocutors
usually hold that if x sees that p, then x is in a position to know and be
certain that p, those implicatures clash with the common ground in (39), which
explains the oddness of (39a). (cf. Karttunen, 1972; Kratzer, 1991; Giannakidou
and Mari, 2016; Goodhue, 2017).
– If must is maximally strong, we can’t (at least straightforwardly) appeal to a
scalar implicatures-based account, but evidential patterns can be explained via
an indirectness presupposition (von Fintel and Gillies, 2010, 2021). An asser-
tion of must φ at w says that φ holds in all the worlds of the epistemic modal
base—i.e., that
⋂
f(w) ⊆ φ—and presupposes that φ is neither entailed by nor
inconsistent with any proposition in f(w) that is directly known. This ‘indi-
rectness’ presupposition is satisfied in (38a) but not in (39a), which explains
why the latter is odd.24
Although both accounts have some initial plausibility, I will argue in what follows
that, as currently formulated, they still have various shortcomings, both empir-
ical and theoretical. My main goal, however, is to defend a combination of the
conditional account with a specific version of the ‘grammatical’ approach to the
computation of scalar implicatures. I will show that the resulting account can deal
with both basic evidential patterns and a several closely related variants, without
24 Mandelkern (2019) develops a novel pragmatic account of evidential uses which can
be paired with maximal/minimal accounts (and arguably also with the conditional non-
maximal/minimal account). I briefly discuss Mandelkern’s account in §5.2.
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negatively affecting our previous (good) results vis-à-vis the other desiderata for
theories of epistemics.
5.1 Evidential uses as default implicatures
Initially, it might seem straightforward to get an adequate conditional plus scalar
implicatures-based account of basic evidential patterns like (38)-(39) (cf. Goodhue,
2017; von Fintel and Gillies, 2010, 2021). Assume for now that we are only deal-
ing with contexts that provide substantive, non-trivial sets of default normality
assumptions for must.25 The target derivation might then go roughly as follows:
(40) (P1)Must φ requires that φ have probability 1 in the set of worlds compat-
ible with the evidence and given some reasonable assumptions about
the world.
(P2)Must φ competes with a stronger (or non-weaker) alternative O(φ)
that either does not conditionalize on the set of normality assump-
tions, or does so on a proper subset of the normality assumptions
used by must.
(C) The use of must φ over O(φ) suggests that the speaker S was not in a
position to assert O(φ), i.e., that S believes that φ follows only given
the evidence and some reasonable but defeasible assumptions.
This sketch raises two questions, however. (i) What alternatives could play the
role of O(φ)? (ii) Why compute scalar implicatures in cases when the resulting
enrichment creates a conflict with the common ground which would otherwise not
occur? Issue (i) is not trivial because, relative to its syntactic category-matching
scale mates, must is arguably at the top of its scale, even if it is not maximally
strong. Yet suppose there is a principled derivation of alternatives that provides
candidates for O(φ). Issue (ii) is still a problem. In standard neo-Gricean frame-
works, implicatures are ultimately computed to ‘increase’ the coherence of asser-
tions/speakers, relative to the common ground. It is thus not clear why interlocu-
tors would systematically compute implicatures which result in enriched readings
that are inconsistent with the common ground, in cases when the literal, non-
enriched readings would not clash with the common ground. Yet this is precisely
what would have to occur in (39a) relative to the common ground in (39).
To address concerns (i) and (ii), I propose that implicature-based accounts
of evidential uses should be implemented in a ‘grammatical’, rather than a neo-
Gricean, approach to scalar implicatures. Grammatical views hold that scalar im-
plicatures are derived compositionally via a covert exhaustification operator, exh,
which for our purposes can be defined as in (41) (Fox, 2007; Chierchia et al.,
2012).26 Exh(φ) asserts φ and the negation of all ‘innocently excludable’ (IE) al-
ternatives to φ. As defined in (41b), an alternative ψ of φ is ‘innocently excludable’
25 Contexts in which that assumption is not satisfied are discussed in §5.2.
26 Grammatical accounts have various advantages over standard Gricean accounts of scalar
implicatures, some of which I discuss below. One that is particularly important for us is that
it allows for the triggering of implicatures in (non-asserted) embedded clauses. Interestingly,
evidential readings seem to occur in such positions. For example, it is intuitively rather odd
to report Ann’s belief state in a scenario like (39) (i.e., when Ann is directly looking at the
pouring rain) as Ann believes that it must be raining.
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just in case (i) we can consistently negate ψ while asserting φ, and (ii) accepting
both φ and ¬ψ doesn’t entail any other alternatives of φ (not already entailed by
φ alone).
(41) a. Jexh(φ)K(w) = JφK(w) ∧ ∀α ∈ IE(φ,Alt(φ)) : ¬JαK(w)
b. IE(φ,Alt(φ)) ={
ψ ∈ Alt(φ) : JφK 6⊆ JψK ∧ ¬∃ψ′[ψ′ ∈ Alt(φ) ∧ (JφK ∧ ¬JψK) ⊆ Jψ′K]
}
This basic framework allows for different views on the distribution of exh and
the procedure which determines the set of alternatives, Alt(φ). On the implemen-
tation I propose, expressions are obligatorily parsed with exh. One motivation
for this move—due originally to Magri (2009, 2014) and defended in Del Pinal
(2021)—is precisely to explain patterns in which interlocutors seem to system-
atically compute implicatures which result in clashes with the common ground
that, had the enrichment not been computed, would have resulted in informative,
felicitous assertions (i.e., to allow for scalar enrichments that decrease the overall
rationality/cooperativeness of speakers). Concerning the determination of Alt(φ),
the choices range from quite formal (Katzir, 2007; Fox and Katzir, 2011) to highly
context sensitive procedures (Swanson, 2010, 2017). Yet most views agree that
Alt(φ) will usually include expressions obtained by replacing any focused scalar
terms in φ with their scale mates. Furthermore, there is increasing agreement that
contextually salient ad hoc scales and alternatives which are not strictly structural
alternatives of φ can also enter into Alt(φ) (Katzir, 2014; Magri, 2017). This is
basically what I will assume here.27
What is the result of exhaustifying must φ? It is reasonable to hold that, in
general, assertions of modalized sentences make salient or are used in contexts
in which other modalized sentences are salient. Accordingly, salient (even if not
strictly formal) alternatives to must φ will often include variations of certain φ,
clear φ, obviously φ, and so on—i.e., similar modalized sentences, roughly com-
parable in terms of structural complexity, with target operators that are either
epistemically maximally strong or at least non-weaker than must. In addition,
these alternatives may also systematically include K+(φ), where K+ is a covert
pure (non-evidential) epistemic necessity operator.28 Let ‘E+s,l’ be a placeholder
for any such (strong/ish) epistemic operator l, anchored to speaker S. The alter-
natives to must φ that are fed to exh can then be schematically represented as in
(42b). Assuming all the alternatives are relevant, the output of exh can then be
represented as in (42d).
(42) It must be raining (= must(φ))
27 I should point out, however, that a quite similar account can be obtained even if we adopt
a more constrained approach such that Alt(φ) only includes strictly structural alternatives of
φ. For discussion, see footnote 29.
28 Independent evidence for the hypothesis that natural languages include a covert epistemic
necessity operator is found in recent work arguing that ignorance implicatures should be derived
compositionally (Meyer, 2013; Buccola and Haida, 2019; Marty and Romoli, 2020). In addition,
as pointed out to me by an editor of L&P, if one adopts a standard Kratzerian semantics for
bare indicative conditionals, one also needs to postulate that natural languages include a covert
pure (non-evidential) epistemic necessity modal, which can appear as the main modal of bare
conditionals. Finally, it is also important to note that Buccola et al. (2021) have recently
argued that covert operators can in general be used to form alternatives of expressions with
overt operators.
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a. exh[must(φ)]
b. Alt(must(φ)) = {might(φ),must(φ), E+s,1(φ), . . . , E
+
s,n(φ)}
c. IE(must(φ), Alt(must(φ))) = {E+s,1(φ), . . . , E
+
s,n(φ)}
d. Jexh[must(φ)]K = must(φ) ∧ ¬E+s,1(φ)∧, . . . ,∧¬E
+
s,n(φ)
Given the interpretation in (42d), an assertion of (42) would convey that S holds
that φ (= it is raining) is entailed given the evidence and some reasonable yet
defeasible assumptions about the world but that S doesn’t hold that φ follows
just from the evidence, or even when the modal base is constrained by a more
austere subset of assumptions about the world. This captures the intuitive content
of (42) in contexts like (38), where interlocutors observe people coming in with wet
umbrellas and clothes but not the rain itself. What about the oddness of assertions
of (42) in contexts like (39), where interlocutors directly perceive that it is raining?
Recall that, on the reading in (42d), an assertion of (42) will entail that S does
not hold that it is, say, obviously/definitely raining. Yet when interlocutors (and
in particular the speaker) are directly perceiving the pouring rain, it is natural
for them to take it as part of the common ground that it is obviously/definitely
raining. This results in a clash between the reading in (42d) and the common
ground. Since exh is obligatory, this clash cannot be resolved by selecting a parse
without exh, which explains the resilient oddness of (42) in contexts like (39).29
29 Crucially, a similar result can be derived while assuming a more constrained procedure
(e.g., strictly structural one) for determining Alt(must(φ)). Yet in this case the grammatical
theory has to then be supplemented with the (increasingly popular) hypothesis that ignorance
implicatures are derived compositionally via the interaction between exh and a (speaker-
centric) epistemic necessity operator K+i (see Meyer, 2013; Fox, 2016; Buccola and Haida,
2019; Marty and Romoli, 2020). Suppose exh is obligatory and K+i optional. (42) can then be
parsed as in (ia), (iia) or (iiia). The alternatives in each case—i.e., in (ib), (iib), and (iiib)—are
either strict scalar alternatives, or obtained through deletion of focused (overt) constituents
(cf. Katzir, 2007; Fox and Katzir, 2011).
(i) a. exh[must(φ)]
b. Alt(must(φ)) = {might(φ),must(φ), φ}
c. IE(must(φ), Alt(must(φ))) = {φ}
d. Jexh[must(φ)]K = must(φ) ∧ ¬φ
(ii) a. K+s [exh(must(φ))]
b. Alt(must(φ)) = {might(φ),must(φ), φ}
c. IE(must(φ), Alt(must(φ))) = {φ}
d. JK+s [exh(must(φ))]K = K+s [must(φ) ∧ ¬φ]
(iii) a. exh[K+s (must(φ))]
b. Alt(K+s (must(φ))) = {K+s (might(φ)),K+s (must(φ)),K+s (φ)}
c. IE(K+s (must(φ)), Alt(K
+
s (must(φ))) = {K+s (φ)}
d. Jexh[K+s (must(φ))]K = K+s (must(φ)) ∧ ¬K+s (φ)
Based on each corresponding derivation, it is easy to check that (ia) and (iia) have interpre-
tations that would in general result in incoherent assertions. In contrast, (iiia) supports the
coherent reading that the speaker S is certain that φ follows from evidence and reasonable
(defeasible) assumptions, but is not certain that φ follows just from the evidence. This ap-
proximates the intuitive reading of must φ in contexts like (38), and arguably still predicts a
clash, hence the resulting oddness, in contexts like (39), i.e., when the interlocutors are likely
to hold that it is part of the common ground that S has the sort of evidence which licenses
being certain that φ.
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It is essential to this account that must-claims are obligatorily parsed with
exh. For unless the parses with exh have the status of a resilient default, precisely
in contexts that clash with the common ground exh could be dropped and must φ
assigned an LF that does not generate any (upper-bounded) implicatures (e.g., an
LF without exh). In this case, must φ could be pragmatically strengthened so as to
entail φ or that φ is certain or perfectly obvious. Accordingly, without obligatory
exh we would be able to explain weakness intuitions in cases like (38a), which
do not result in oddness, but not in cases like (39a), which do result in oddness.
Again, the hypothesis that exh is mandatory is not an ad hoc stipulation included
here simply to derive the observed patterns with evidential uses of modals. That
hypothesis has been independently defended precisely on the grounds that it is
needed to explain oddness patterns that arguably involve a clash between the
common ground and interpretations enriched with implicatures (cf. Magri, 2009,
2011; Marty and Romoli, 2020; Del Pinal, 2021).
This implicature-based derivation of evidential readings of must can easily
deal with extensions of basic evidential patterns that remain an open challenge
to the package of maximal must with an indirectness presupposition. Contrast
our original example in (39a), where Ann can’t felicitously assert the must-claim
when looking at the pouring rain, with variations like the ones in (43a)-(43b)
(adapted from von Fintel and Gillies 2010 and Goodhue 2017), where the must-
claims substantially improve in acceptability:
(43) Ann and Jasmine are discussing—after a seminar on scepticism which
they took very seriously—whether they should go out. They look out the
window: it looks as if it’s pouring rain.
a. Ann: It looks as if it’s raining outside. There is no good reason to
think that both of our perceptual systems are simultaneously unre-
liable/malfunctioning. So it must be raining outside. Let’s get our
coffee in the basement.
b. Ann: It looks as if it’s raining outside. Although we can’t {be certain/
totally sure/really know} that our perceptual systems aren’t mislead-
ing us, there is no reason to take that possibility seriously. So it must
be raining outside. Let’s get our coffee in the basement.
In (43), Ann has direct perceptual information of the sort that usually warrants
asserting that φ (= it’s raining outside). Yet additional factors in this kind of set-
ting suggest that Ann isn’t certain, or completely willing to self-ascribe knowledge,
that φ. Still, φ does follow given the (direct) evidence and some reasonable (defea-
sible) assumptions about the world, such as that human perceptual systems are
veridical. Accordingly, the conditional plus grammatical account correctly predicts
that must φ can be felicitously asserted, as in (43a) and (43b). In contrast, the
indirectness presupposition account faces two open challenges. One is to explain
how evidence coming from the same source can change in status from direct to
indirect as a function of context. The other is to explain why the must-claims
improve, relative to original cases such as (39a), even when the speaker explicitly
acknowledges some degree of epistemic doubt in the prejacent.30
30 The conditional plus grammatical account coheres well with other results emphasized in
recent work on the evidential patterns of epistemics. First, since Alt is sensitive to salient
alternatives, this account is flexible relative to which epistemic operators are excluded, and
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5.2 Evidential uses, doxastic strength and strong uses of must
According to my conditional plus grammatical account, evidential readings of must
have a degree of epistemic weakness in the sense that, given the target LFs and
contexts, must φ assertions typically entail that φ doesn’t hold unconditionally
given just the relevant evidence. Yet we have also discussed cases—e.g., down-
playing scenarios and deductive conclusions—in which must-claims seem to have
maximal doxastic or epistemic strength. I will now argue that there is no prob-
lematic tension looming here.
To begin to bring out the sense in which must-claims are doxastically strong,
consider the examples in (44), inspired by Copley (2004, 2006) and Swanson (2016).
Fixing for their epistemic readings, an assertion of must φ generates oddness when
it is conjoined with an assertion of ¬φ or of Bs(¬φ), as illustrated in (44a)-(44b).
In contrast, must φ improves when it is conjoined with assertions which entail or
presuppose the bare possibility that ¬φ, as illustrated in (44c)-(44d).
(44) John left an hour ago; there’s no traffic; distance is short. QUD: Is John
at the party (where the interlocutors are)?
a. John1 must be here by now. #But he1 isn’t here yet.
b. John1 must be here by now. #But I believe he1 isn’t here yet.
c. John1 must be here by now. But there is a small chance that he1
isn’t.
d. John1 must be here by now. But I sure hope he1 isn’t.
Why are (44a)-(44b) odd, whereas (44c)-(44d) are fine or at least significantly
improved?31
allows for stronger enrichments than the one obtained by adding the negation of strict epistemic
necessity (e.g., enrichments can incorporate, depending on the context, negation of certainty,
clarity or obviousness, just like ‘some’ claims can be enriched so as to exclude ‘all’, ‘most’ or
‘half’ claims, depending on the context). Secondly, it predicts that cross-linguistic counterparts
of must should follow the same evidential patterns. Third, it predicts that other strong(ish/er)
epistemic modals should generate similar evidential patterns (if they also conditionalize on
defeasible normality assumptions, in a way that renders them compatible with the negation
of strict epistemic necessity). Fourth, it explains why can’t-claims generate evidential patterns
similar to those observed for must—at least if it turns out that, in general, can’t φ is a spell
out of ¬might φ rather than of ¬possible φ. For example, S can felicitously assert It can’t
be raining if S sees people coming in with shorts and dry clothes, but the same assertion
would be odd if S is looking directly at the sunny and clear sky. The default LF for such
can’t-claims is exh[¬might(φ)]. Since might is a ‘live’ possibility operator, the prejacent is
asymmetrically entailed by alternatives such as ¬possible φ, which will thus be negated by
exh when salient and relevant, giving rise to enriched readings along the lines of ¬might φ ∧
possible φ. The entailment that, given S’s evidence, it’s possible that it’s raining conflicts with
what interlocutors will usually take to be in the common ground when S is looking directly at
a sunny and clear sky.
31 In their original examples, Copley (2004, 2006) and Swanson (2016) focused on the obser-
vation that while should φ can be conjoined with ¬φ, as in (ia), other (genuine) epistemics,
including live and bare possibility ones, generate oddness in parallel structures, as illustrated
in (ib)-(ic):
(i) John left an hour ago; there’s no traffic; distance is short.
a. So John1 should/ought to be here by now. But he1 isn’t here yet.
b. So John1 is probably/must be here by now. #But he1 isn’t here yet.
c. So John1 is possibly/might be here by now. #But he1 isn’t here yet.
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Given the conditional plus grammatical account, and the context and conver-
sational goals in (44), the must-claims in (44a)-(44d) are parsed by default as in
(45a), and assigned the interpretation in (45b), where we assume that E+s,1 is a
(nearly or strictly) maximally strong and contextually salient epistemic operator:
(45) John must be here by now (= must(φ))
a. LF: exh[must(φ)]
b. Jexh[must(φ)]K = must(φ) ∧ ¬E+s,1(φ) |= Bs(φ)
Recall that, when the epistemic space and normality assumptions are anchored to
the speaker S, the conditional account guarantees that must(φ) |= Bs(φ), and our
background doxastic logic ensures that S can coherently believe φ while holding
that φ isn’t, say, certain or perfectly obvious (see §2.4). This Bs(φ) doxastic en-
tailment constrains the kinds of assertions that can be conjoined with contents like
(45b). For example, if conjoined with an assertion which entails or strongly sug-
gests that Bs(¬φ), we get an incoherent discourse, which explains why (44a)-(44b)
are odd. At the same time, (45b) is strictly compatible with the bare possibility
that ¬φ, which explains the improved acceptability of (44c)-(44d).32
I have argued that the conditional plus grammatical account of evidential uses
doesn’t reduce, in unattested ways, the doxastic strength of must-claims. The next
task is to show that this account is also compatible with the kinds of cases that
seem to require maximal epistemic strength, e.g., felicitous uses of must-claims in
deductive conclusions.
According to the conditional account, the discourse context provides a set of
relevant normality assumptions, picked out by g, which the speaker (and interlocu-
tors) believe, at least for the purposes at hand. In everyday contexts—deciding
whether to go outside, whether someone’s at the party, and so on—those back-
ground assumptions usually include substantive propositions that, although be-
lieved, are explicitly represented as defeasible, non-trivial claims about the world.
Strictly speaking, it is relative to those kinds of ordinary contexts and correspond-
ing set of normality assumptions that we derive the standard evidential interpre-
tation of must-claims from their default parses of the form exh[must φ]. For given
the definition of exh in (41), a E+s,1(φ), . . . , E
+
s,n(φ) alternative is excludable only
if its negation is compatible with must φ, a condition that may be satisfied when
must φ is given a non-maximal interpretation (by being restricted with normality
Contrasts like the one between (ia) and (ib)-(ic) suggest that ‘should/ought’ (can) have a
‘pseudo-epistemic’ reading—which doesn’t use an epistemic modal base—akin to the account of
‘normally’ defended by Yalcin (2016). From this perspective, should/ought shouldn’t in general
be used to set or try to reveal the baseline behavior of strong-ish (but non-maximal) epistemic
operators in specific constructions/contexts (as von Fintel and Gillies (2010) sometimes do).
32 Some readers have pointed out to me that (44d) feels more natural than (44c). This judg-
ment isn’t surprising from the perspective of the conditional plus grammatical account. Strictly
speaking, the bare possibility assertion in (44c) is borderline redundant (I say ‘borderline’ be-
cause it may still clarify to other interlocutors that S is using a set of normality assumptions
that includes defeasible propositions). Redundancy can generate oddness, but the conditions
under which it does so are intricate and the judgments usually less strong than in cases of
incoherence. Still, from this perspective, the hope-claim in (44d) should feel improved because,
although it entails/presupposes that, relative to S’s evidence, its strictly possible that John
isn’t at the party, it also adds the novel information that S would prefer it if John isn’t at the
party (yet), which is obviously not conveyed by the initial must-claim.
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assumptions at least some of which are not held with maximum certainty). These
conditions are schematically captured in (46a)-(46c):
(46) must φ (typical everyday contexts)
a. LF: exh[must φ]
b. Given c, w, g includes defeasible, non-trivial assumptions.
c. Jexh[must φ]Kc,w,e,g = must(φ)∧¬E+s,1(φ)∧, . . . ,∧¬E
+
s,n(φ) |= Bs(φ)
Yet consider a context c′ that provides a value for g that only includes triv-
ial assumptions, e.g., some basic tautologies and inference rules. This may occur
whenever it is part of the common ground that interlocutors are only interested
in the deductive consequences of their premises or information. Such a set of nor-
mality assumptions will usually also satisfy the doxastic requirement that they be
believed; but it may well include no assumptions that are also represented as de-
feasible.33 In a context like c′, then, the speaker S can be represented as not only
believing but also as being certain about those background assumptions. What
follows from this? According to our grammatical account, the default LFs are still
as in (46a). Let ‘K+s ’ stand for a maximally strong, unrestricted epistemic neces-
sity operator anchored to S. In a context like c′ where g returns only propositions
of which S is certain, must φ entails not just Bs(φ) but also K
+
s (φ). As a result,
most candidates for E+s,l(φ) will not count as excludable alternatives of must φ,
hence exh will be vacuous, returning only its prejacent, and we are left with a
strong reading for (46a), as captured in (46c). In these specific conditions, then,
we allow for felicitous uses of must φ in deductive conclusions.34
(47) must φ (deductive contexts)
a. LF: exh[must φ]
b. Given c′, w, g includes just trivial assumptions.
c. Jexh[must φ]Kc
′,w,e,g = must(φ) |= Bs(φ),K+s (φ)
According to the conditional plus grammatical account, then, the context sen-
sitivity of normality assumptions is such that, although in many everyday contexts
must is assigned a non-maximal epistemic reading, there are specific conditions in
which it’s assigned a maximally strong reading. This proposal raises three concerns
which I want to briefly address.
33 To be sure, interlocutors can represent even trivial assumptions as defeasible in special
cases, such as in discussions of metaphysics and philosophical logic.
34 To be clear, I’m not suggesting that the only way to allow for felicitous uses of must-
claims in deductive conclusions is via selection of ‘trivial’ normality assumptions (thus blocking
the exclusion of any E+i,l(φ) alternative of must φ). Given the conditional plus grammatical
package, other possibilities naturally emerge. In some cases, exh can associate, in LFs of the
form exh[must φ], with (constituents of) φ, rather than with must : e.g., an assertion of it must
be rainingF can express (i) that the evidence given background assumptions entails that it is
raining and (ii) that it is not the case that they entail that it is, say, snowing. In cases like this,
there’s no obligatory enrichment to instances of ¬E+i,l(φ). In other cases, the discourse may
make it clear that the only relevant alternatives are, say, might vs. must-claims. And since to
be considered for exclusion by exh, alternatives of the prejacent should also be relevant, in
these cases exh[must φ] will not implicate weakness. When considering specific variations of
evidential patterns and their interaction with deductive uses, it is important to keep in mind
these additional mechanisms for generating enriched readings.
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First, if g can pick a trivial set of normality assumptions for must, why don’t
interlocutors simply go for that option in cases, like (39a), when selecting a more
substantive set results in non-maximal readings which trigger obligatory impli-
catures that generate oddness? This strategy is not generally available for the
following reason. The conditional plus grammatical account rests on the assump-
tion that discourse contexts must provide a value for g—i.e., a set of relevant
normality assumptions—in a way that is, to some degree, independent of the goal
of simply trying to make the speakers’ utterances felicitous and correct. The goals
of interlocutors, conventions and standards appropriate to specific domains, and
the question under discussion all contribute to determine specific sets of back-
ground normality assumptions. Crucially, similar observations factors and con-
straints guide domain restrictions of quantifiers in general. Consider this example:
(48) A and B are roommates and just got back from grocery shopping. They
bought 4 bottles of coconut water.
a. A: Where’s the coconut water we got today?
B: All the coconut water is in the fridge.
Suppose that, in w1, two bottles of coconut water are in the fridge and two in
the floor by the garage door. In general, we would hold that B’s response in
(48a) is false in w1, even though there are various domain restrictions of ‘all’ that
would make it true (e.g., ‘all the coconut water [in the kitchen] is in the fridge’).
Suppose that, in w2, all four bottles are in the fridge. In general, we would hold
that B’s response in (48a) is true in w2, even though there are various coconut
water bottles within, say, a three mile radius of A and B’s home that are not
in their fridge. Accordingly, the salient domain restriction, in a context like (48),
is roughly ‘the coconut water that A and B just bought that is somewhere in
their house/car’. Interlocutors can’t just freely modify that salient domain to e.g.
ensure the correctness of the resulting utterance. In this respect, the normality
assumptions picked out by g work just like other types of domain restrictions.35
The second concern is this, take a context like c′, from (47) above, which
captures schematically uses of must in deductive inferences. Why would a speaker
S ever choose to use must φ, in c′, instead of the apparently less ambiguous φ? In
other words, why would S risk being misinterpreted in c′ by using a sentence that
could be interpreted as non-maximal and even substantially hedged, such as must
φ, instead of simply asserting the bare φ (which given a knowledge or similar norm
of assertion would generally convey a strong epistemic commitment)? The reason
is that must φ—even when used strongly by conditionalizing on a slim or trivial set
of normality assumptions—conveys additional information not typically conveyed
by an assertion of φ alone: namely, that the reason S holds φ is because it follows
from this or that specific set of relevant/salient evidence. That is, an assertion of
35 To be sure, this doesn’t exclude the possibility that interlocutors sometimes do tinker
with their assignments of normality assumptions precisely to rescue a must-claim that would
otherwise be odd or too obviously true/false. This might happen when they are unsure about
elements of the common ground, incl. the broad goals/standards/topics of the conversation.
Imagine a tourist wandering through a hotel lobby which, unbeknownst to them, is holding
a philosophy conference, and trying to make sense of utterances like ‘we all have a visual
representation as if it is pouring rain outside; there is no reason to think we are hallucinating
in perfect synchrony; so it must be raining’.
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must φ, more reliably than assertion of φ, highlights information about the specific
argument or grounds that S has for holding φ.36
The third concern stems from the observation, due to Mandelkern (2019), that
there may be additional felicity constraints on must-claims even in conclusions of
deductions. To illustrate, Mandelkern points to the contrast between odd uses of
must in conclusions of deductive inferences that are too obvious, such as (49a),
vs. improved uses in conclusions of deductions that are slightly more complex or
involved, as in (50a).
(49) A: How many marbles do you have? B: I have two bags of marbles. There
are (exactly) two marbles in one bag, and (exactly) three marbles in the
other...
a. B: ??So I must have (exactly) five marbles.
b. B: So I have (exactly) five marbles.
(50) A: How many marbles do you have? B: I have twenty six bags of marbles,
and each bag has at least seven marbles...
a. B: So I must have at least one hundred and eighty two marbles.
b. B: So I have at least one hundred and eighty two marbles.
Given evidence E, precisely which inferences count as ‘mutually obvious’ depends
on the context. Furthermore, the operative notion of obviousness seems to be
sensitive to kinds or domains of deductive inferences in a way that is not yet
fully understood. For example, why would simple arithmetic operations, such as
those in (49a), count as too (mutually) obvious to support a must φ-conclusion,
whereas inferences based on simple applications of the disjunctive syllogism or
modus ponens—standard examples of felicitous uses of must φ in deductive con-
clusions, as in (28) and (29)—do not count as obvious to the same degree (indeed,
developmentally and cross-culturally, there is evidence that the latter logical in-
ferences tend to be easier in the sense that they are more widely available and
independent of formal education)? Still, I think that the basic pattern illustrated
in (49)-(50) holds within specific domains, in the sense that the degree of felic-
ity of a must φ deductive conclusion tends to improve as the complexity of the
supporting inference increases.
Using the unique resources of the conditional plus grammatical account, there is
a natural way of approaching these patterns which incorporates a key insight from
Mandelkern’s own account. Recall why, according to the conditional plus gram-
matical account, must φ typically conveys, in a case like (49a), a maximally strong
epistemic claim: the background assumptions are ‘trivial’ principles of arithmetic
and inference rules, which are generally held with certainty, and as a result, must
φ conveys that φ follows with full certainty from the explicit premises/evidence. So
although the must φ claim is exhaustified, no relevant alternatives—schematically
represented as E+s,1(φ), . . . , E
+
s,n(φ)—are excludable because for none of them can
their negation be consistently conjoined with a maximally strong reading of must
φ. However, one could argue that, if we look more carefully into the semantic
structure of the alternatives in E+s,1(φ), . . . , E
+
s,n(φ), the previous prediction should
be revised in a subtle but important way. This is because there are alternatives,
36 For discussion of this ‘specific support for the prejacent’ component of must-claims, see
Stone (1994), Mandelkern (2019), Murray (2020) and Waldon (2021).
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potentially salient in the relevant cases—think of instances of obviously φ, plainly
φ, and so on—which are arguably semantically conjunctive in that they convey
not just that φ is certain, or has maximal probability, given evidence E, but also
that φ follows from E in a simple or transparent way (cf. Barker, 2009). Crucially,
maximal uses of must φ can be consistently conjoined with the negation of such
semantically conjunctive epistemic operators.37 The resulting enriched reading
would be, roughly, that φ is entailed by the evidence and background assumptions
(in this case held with certainty), but not in a way that is completely obvious or
transparent.38
At this point, I hope to have shown that the conditional plus grammatical
account provides a promising and flexible approach to evidential uses of must (and
other epistemics), including infelicitous uses, puzzling variations of the basic cases,
and oddness patterns which point to a systematic restriction within maximally
strong uses.
6 Conclusion
We have examined three prima facie reasonable accounts concerning the strength
of epistemic must and might : the maximal/minimal account in (8), the threshold-
based non-maximal/minimal account in (9), and the conditional non-maximal/mi-
nimal account in (10). While each account can explain some of the target desider-
37 To see this, assume at least one of the alternatives in E+s,1(φ), . . . , E
+
s,n(φ) is interpreted as
semantically entailing both an epistemic necessity claim and an evidential ‘not too obvious or
clear or direct’ condition, which we can schematically represent as K+(φ) ∧EV (φ). Negating
that we get ¬K(φ) ∨ ¬EV (φ), which can be consistently conjoined with a maximally strong
interpretation of must φ, and the result would be equivalent to K+(φ)∧¬EV (φ) . Now, recent
work on evidentials suggests that some of the relevant operators—involved in contextually
salient alternatives for must—may well have a non-trivial at issue vs. non-at issue/presupposed
semantic structure, rather than a flat conjunctive semantic structure (see Murray, 2020). This
might complicate the previous result when the relevant alternatives are negated (since e.g.,
the evidential part, EV (φ), may project out of negation if modeled as presupposed). However,
even assuming that an operator like, say, obviously presupposes rather than asserts either
K+(φ) or its EV (φ) entailments, we can still maintain the target result by appealing to a
local accommodation operator, which may be licensed in fairly standard ways by the pressure
to avoid inconsistencies or empty/vacuous applications of exh.
38 Another option for dealing with patterns like (49)-(50), which is compatible with the con-
ditional plus grammatical account, is to endorse Mandelkern proposal directly. This proposal
is based on the interaction between the semantics of must (esp., the component which says
that the prejacent follows from the relevant/salient evidence) and some independently motived
pragmatic constraints (esp., a version of the principle that assertions shouldn’t be redundant
given the information in the common ground). From those premises, Mandelkern derives a fe-
licity constraint which says, roughly, that must φ assertions are infelicitous if the way in which
φ follows from the evidence is too obvious to the interlocutors. That explains why (49a) is odd,
while (50a) is comparatively better. From the perspective of the conditional plus grammatical
account, the premises of Mandelkern’s account are satisfied at least in contexts that result
in strong uses of must φ. Accordingly, such strong uses would be subject to the fully general
pragmatic principles that, according to Mandelkern, further restrict their distribution. I won’t
try to empirically separate Mandelkern’s original account with the grammatical exh-based
implementation I proposed above, but a key difference might be whether we also observe an
anti-obviousness constraint in embedded, maximally strong uses of must. For such cases are
directly expected on the grammatical account, since exh may appear in embedded positions,
but would require some arguably non-trivial modification of the fully pragmatic account so as
to get a plausible notion of redundancy relative to local contexts.
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ata, I have argued that only the conditional one can make sense, in a uniform way,
of the intricate behavior of must and might in (embedded) epistemic tensions,
deductive contexts, contexts of risk, downplaying dialogues, and various kinds of
evidential uses. To be sure, some details need to be worked out before the condi-
tional account can be considered part of a general theory of the epistemic auxil-
iaries, including its compositional implementation, integration with non-epistemic
readings, and connections to related terms and constructions.
Yet even at this preliminary stage, this result issues in a corrective lesson for
proponents of probabilistic approaches. Suppose one accepts Kratzer’s claim that
must should not be modeled as simple necessity nor might as simple possibility.
Given a probabilistic-measure semantics, it is tempting to take advantage of its
expressive power and implement that insight by directly tweaking the thresholds
for must and might (e.g., Swanson, 2006; Lassiter, 2016, 2017). Yet our investi-
gation suggests that we should reject that move and instead implement Kratzer’s
insight by appealing to an operation that conditionalizes by default on normality
assumptions. From this perspective, we should think of must and might not so
much as vehicles for expressing what is ‘almost certain’ and ‘practically possible’,
but rather as vehicles for expressing what is certain and possible given the relevant
evidence and a set of contextually appropriate background assumptions about the
world.
Theoretically, the conditional account has substantial appeal. Reasoning purely
on the basis of what is known, or what we take ourselves to know, has an important
place in our discursive and deliberative practices. Yet in most everyday contexts,
we reason not just from evidence but also from various non-trivial background as-
sumptions about the way the world normally is or goes, default assumptions which
we (tend to) believe even when we don’t represent ourselves as strictly knowing
them. From this perspective, we expect to find some conventionalized ways of ex-
pressing this mode of common sense reasoning from evidence, independently of
whether the language system interfaces with, or has access to, a kind of natu-
ral probabilistic logic. According to the conditional account, this is precisely the
function of must, might and their cross-linguistic counterparts.
As I said at the outset, the main goal of this paper is to discriminate amongst
various accounts of the semantic strength of the epistemic auxiliaries, and not
directly to motivate the move to probabilistic frameworks. Yet one might suspect
that my case for the conditional account bears on the latter issue. At first glance,
only the threshold-based account seems to require a probabilistic implementa-
tion. By tinkering with the thresholds as in (11) to capture the relative force of
epistemics, it uses the unique resources of a measure semantics. In addition, the
view that must means something like ‘very likely’ has the consequence that it is
not obvious how to satisfactorily translate this account into a standard ordering
semantics.39 In contrast, the conditional account can be translated into an order-
ing semantics without affecting its descriptive adequacy relative to the patterns
39 Whether this is ultimately a reason to adopt (i) a measure semantics and (ii) a proba-
bilistic one depends on open debates about the logic needed to model epistemics like likely
and probably. Yalcin (2010) and Lassiter (2015, 2017) develop measure semantic accounts that
respect finite additivity and capture various desirable inference patterns not captured by stan-
dard ordering accounts. But Holliday and Icard (2013) show that one can capture the target
patterns with a weaker measure semantics with qualitative additivity or an ordering semantics
with certain lifting functions.
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examined here. So my argument for the conditional account could be taken to
suggest that, at least for modeling the epistemic auxiliaries, there is no need for a
measure semantics, even less for a genuinely probabilistic one. However, there are
other reasons to adopt a probabilistic measure semantics: e.g., the potential for
gradability of at least some epistemic auxiliaries (Santorio and Romoli, 2017; Las-
siter, 2017), interactions between nested auxiliaries under other epistemics (Moss,
2015; Cariani, 2016), subtle differences in the evidential behavior and doxastic
implications of epistemics with similar force (Swanson, 2016), and theoretical uni-
formity/simplicity should we conclude that other natural language operators and
expressions have access to a probabilistic measure semantics.40 Whether these are
ultimately good reasons to adopt, for our models of the auxiliaries, not just a
measure semantics but a genuine probabilistic one is still an open question.
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